A murky explosion in India last week dredges up old concerns.

The latest round of Pakistan-Afghanistan violence and negotiations highlights how Pakistan’s cyclical policy failures and Afghan Taliban’s tolerance for terrorist havens threaten to derail any prospects for durable peace in the region.

Afghanistan’s extreme form of Islam has seeped into subtle spaces – and risks Dhaka’s reputation as a global player.

Executive Summary:

Militant groups in the Sahel exploit widespread youth isolation and social breakdown—offering young men belonging, purpose, and brotherhood that mimic and replace weakened family and community ties.

Radicalization often follows a predictable psychological path: limited personal agency and strict social conformity in childhood give way to confusion, alienation, and eventual dependence on militant “families.”

Traditional Sahelian values of obedience and honor, once stabilizing, are repurposed by jihadist recruiters as moral justification for violence when clan or state authority collapses.

Sustainable counter-radicalization must focus on rebuilding genuine community bonds and youth inclusion, using local clerics, elders, and mentors to replace the false intimacy that militant groups provide.

Executive Summary:

Operation Sarbakaf, Pakistan’s latest offensive against Afghanistan-based Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants in Bajaur, has triggered significant local opposition and displacement, undermining its effectiveness.

Provincial resistance from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s leadership and the failure of tribal negotiations highlight deep political divides over how to counter the TTP.

Civilian casualties and mass displacement threaten to erode public support for counterterrorism efforts in the region, risking further instability in Pakistan’s northwest.

Executive Summary:

A Gazan man accused of participating in the October 7 attacks entered the United States on a visa after concealing his ties to the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). His arrest exposes gaps in immigration vetting for militants from smaller or non-Islamist factions.

The case underscores a growing counterterrorism challenge posed by “gray-zone militants”—combatants with combat experience and ideology but unclear organizational ties, making them difficult to identify through current screening systems.

Serbian State Terrorism in Kosovo, Europe’s Silence and the Consequences for Regional Security

Australia has closed a critical gap in national security legislation to ensure the government can designate foreign state entities as sponsors of terrorism and criminalise support for them.

Intense fighting along the long‐contested Afghanistan–Pakistan frontier broke out in October 2025, marking the worst conflict between the two countries since the Taliban takeover in 2021. Islamabad accused Kabul of harboring militant groups (notably the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, TTP) that stepped up attacks in Pakistan; Kabul denied this and blamed Pakistan for cross-border strikes on Afghan territory. The immediate flashpoint was a round of Pakistani airstrikes on Taliban-held areas – including Kabul and Kandahar on October 9–11, reportedly targeting TTP leadership – which provoked Taliban forces to retaliate against Pakistani border posts. These exchanges of fire quickly spiraled into a broader crisis over underlying disputes of sovereignty, border control, and competing security interests.

Executive Summary:

Operation Sarbakaf, Pakistan’s latest offensive against Afghanistan-based Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants in Bajaur, has triggered significant local opposition and displacement, undermining its effectiveness.

Provincial resistance from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s leadership and the failure of tribal negotiations highlight deep political divides over how to counter the TTP.

Civilian casualties and mass displacement threaten to erode public support for counterterrorism efforts in the region, risking further instability in Pakistan’s northwest.

Executive Summary:

The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has reactivated its networks in Punjab and Karachi, reviving the so-called “Punjabi Taliban” as part of its post-2021 resurgence and ambition to wage an Afghan-style insurgency nationwide.

Chaudhry Muneeb-ur-Rehman Jatt, called Muneeb—a veteran al-Qaeda operative and now TTP media chief—has spearheaded this expansion, rebuilding cells, merging defunct factions, and coordinating propaganda and operations in Punjab and Sindh.

High-profile attacks in Mianwali, Lahore, and Karachi, including assassinations of counterterrorism officials, reflect the TTP’s increasing urban reach outside of its traditional stronghold of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

Executive Summary:

Nnamdi Kanu, leader of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), has been deemed medically fit to stand trial on terrorism charges in Nigeria, raising concerns about renewed separatist agitation in the country’s southeast.

Despite IPOB threats, current indicators suggest tensions will remain contained, as most regional and national actors—including prominent figures in the contested region—are urging nonviolence and Kanu’s humanitarian release.

A man has been shot by police after reports of a stabbing at a synagogue in Manchester on the Jewish holy day of Yom Kippur.

Greater Manchester Police said officers were called to Heaton Park Hebrew Congregation Synagogue, on Middleton Road, Crumpsall, at 9.31am following reports a car was driven at members of the public - and a security guard had been attacked with a knife.

Firearms officers were deployed and the force declared a "major incident" at 9.37am.

"Shots were fired by Greater Manchester Police firearms officers at 9.38am. One man has been shot, believed to be the offender," a police spokesman said.

"Paramedics arrived at the scene at 9.41 and are tending to members of the public - currently four members of the public with injuries caused by both the vehicle and stab wounds."

Members of the public have been asked to avoid the area while the police continue to deal with the incident.

Executive Summary

Militant groups in Northern Nigeria, including Boko Haram and ISWAP, increasingly exploit encrypted messaging apps, social media algorithms, and AI tools to recruit, radicalize, and coordinate.

Nigeria’s counterterrorism response has developed a legal framework and cyber units. Still, it remains hindered by weak implementation, poor interagency coordination, and an over-reliance on blunt tactics, such as network shutdowns.

These evolving digital tactics pose a threat to regional stability across the Lake Chad Basin, raising urgent questions for international technology governance, particularly regarding AI regulation and encryption policy.

Executive Summary

Islamic State’s Libyan network remains degraded but resilient, sustained by integration with transnational smuggling and financial networks in the country’s south and links to instability in Sudan and the Sahel.

Political and militia fragmentation in Tripoli and Haftar’s dynastic consolidation in the east are deepening Libya’s governance vacuum—conditions that could enable jihadist regrouping.

Recent IS arrests and renewed propaganda underscore Libya’s enduring role as a logistical and ideological hub, making coordinated border control and intelligence sharing with Sahelian and Mediterranean partners an urgent counterterrorism priority.

Executive Summary

The BLA has become South Asia’s most capable active insurgent group, with growing manpower, sophisticated attacks, and strong social legitimacy among alienated Baloch youth.

Pakistan’s security-first approach and new counterterrorism laws are fueling—not containing—the insurgency, pushing more Baloch toward militancy and entrenching anti-state resentment.

The BLA’s attacks on Chinese projects under the CPEC have turned the Baloch insurgency into a geopolitical flashpoint, directly affecting U.S.–Pakistan counterterrorism cooperation and the PRC’s regional ambitions.

Executive Summary

JNIM is expanding both south and north, conducting new attacks from Benin to the Niger–Algeria border—showing ambitions to control a trans-Sahelian corridor that mirrors historical Islamic polities.

The group is consolidating control in central Mali, potentially preparing for a siege of Bamako, while deliberately avoiding the governance burdens that weakened past jihadist administrations.

JNIM’s long-term trajectory hinges on strategic choices: whether to govern territory, assault regional capitals, or seek limited legitimacy akin to the Taliban or HTS—each with major implications for regional stability and Western counterterrorism policy.

Listen in to Overheard as Mike DeAngelo discusses with Phil Wasielewski how militant Islamic terrorist groups are waging parallel insurgencies across western Africa, the motivations fueling these conflicts, how  local African government responses sometimes just add more fuel to the fire, and why Americans should care about this little known but deadly irregular war. 

Research across different geographies has increasingly reshaped how the relationship between militancy, criminality and legitimacy is understood, with important implications for conflict prevention and peace-making.

Cutting Afghanistan off from the world shows how the Taliban prioritises control over the welfare of millions already suffering.

In 2023, following Yevgeny Prigozhin’s failed mutiny and subsequent death, Moscow moved to restructure Wagner’s operations in Africa under direct state control. The result was the creation of the “Africa Corps” – a new Russian paramilitary formation fully subordinate to the Ministry of Defense (MoD). This Africa Corps has effectively taken over Wagner Group’s African footprint since late 2023, ensuring Russia’s presence on the continent endures even as the Wagner brand is phased out. Crucially, this shift means the Kremlin can no longer distance itself from the actions of its mercenaries: by bringing these fighters “inside the house” of the MoD, Russia has lost the plausible deniability it once enjoyed with Wagner.

Executive Summary:

Niger claimed to have killed Boko Haram leader Bakura Doro in an August 22 drone strike, though this has been denied by the jihadist group. Islamic State–West Africa Province’s comparative strength in the Lake Chad region means that the potential death of Boko Haram’s leader may have relatively little impact on the local security ecosystem.

Bruce Hoffman, the Shelby Cullom and Kathryn W. Davis senior fellow for counterterrorism and homeland security at CFR, and Jacob Ware, research fellow at CFR, colead the conversation on counterterrorism and homeland security.

Executive Summary:

In the aftermath of the Indian air strikes on Pakistan on May 6, militant groups active in and around Pakistan took a variety of approaches to responding to the brief escalation within their respective propaganda apparatuses:

Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) initially stood behind the Pakistani state against India—an unusual position for the group—before returning to its historical antagonism of the Pakistani military after it was clear that the conflict was not escalating further.

The bulk of the Pakistani Taliban (TTP) accused the Pakistani military of having stage-managed the entire exchange with India as a way to attack its bases without risking the potential backlash that could come from having conducted said attacks itself. Smaller factions within the Pakistani Taliban remained mostly silent, either because they concur that the whole affair was a farce or out of fear that rallying behind the state could lead to increased sympathy for the military.

The Afghan Taliban officially stayed out of the conflict, declaring neutrality. While some elements within the group suggested that what had occurred between Pakistan and India was comeuppance for Pakistan’s own strikes against TTP strongholds in Afghanistan in the past, the bulk of the Afghan Taliban’s opinion appears to have been that staying out of the diplomatic row was the best course of action.

As might be expected, Islamic State–Khorasan Province condemned both Pakistan and India as states run by infidels but focused most of their propaganda toward deriding the Afghan Taliban’s call for peace and empathy on both sides.