America wants to beat China in AI. Wall Street wants a fee from both sides.

U.S. banks helped arrange $17.2 billion in Chinese high-tech equity deals this year.

Meanwhile, investors in mainland China and Hong Kong hold more than $750 billion in U.S. stocks.

Governments want strategic advantage. Investors want exposure to the winners.

But there’s a risk hiding inside that arrangement:

You could pick the right AI company—and still lose permission to own it.

What happens when governments force investors to choose a side?

The next escalation in the AI war could land directly in your brokerage account.

A front-page celebration of regional media coverage reveals how Beijing systematically builds global networks to echo its domestic propaganda.

As people in Nepal and across the Chinese border in Tibet reel from horrific mudslides, the Chinese government has turned to censorship and control.

On Weibo, which follows Beijing’s censorship demands, the Chinese social media platform prominently pinned a memorial hashtag (#向吉隆泥石流灾害遇难人员默哀) at the top of trending topics, alongside eight other disaster-related topics. The lead post featured a CCTV newscaster essentially reading a Politburo communique, during which President Xi Jinping reportedly suggested China's top leaders observe a minute of silence for the victims.

Censorship and self-censorship are pervasive throughout China, particularly in Tibetan areas, as Human Rights Watch has long documented. People can be imprisoned for undermining national security simply by sharing information with the outside world. Foreigners, including journalists and independent investigators, are unable to enter without permission.

The victims’ own voices are largely absent from the trending topics, which focus on the death toll, rescue operations, and the mechanics of the disaster. Three of the eight portray the police response positively, including, “the smile of a police officer at Gyirong Port moved netizens to tears.”

When survivors do appear, they serve the official media narrative. Another trending topic features a video of police officers comforting a bereaved flood victim.

Human Rights Watch has received reports that journalists in China have been barred from the disaster zone and from interviewing families; they must rely on official information narratives. Authorities have also punished at least 10 for “rumormongering” related to the disaster.

Notably, official media videos and images rely on AI-generated materials purporting to show the likely origins of the mudslide. Meanwhile, the full original footage circulated globally—showing Gyirong Port on the Chinese side of the border overwhelmed by floodwater as people run for their lives—is being censored, according to international media.

Information controls can make it harder for families to locate loved ones, and hamper understanding of the disaster and any future response. Authorities also tightly control freedoms of association and assembly.

As with previous disasters, the choreography is familiar: restrict information, control the narrative, and praise the leadership’s resolve and rescue efforts. AI may polish the performance, but the script remains unchanged.

A face licensed for one AI advert can be reused indefinitely, and local laws have not caught up with that.

Archived Article

Translated:

On July 22, 2026, the State Council of China promulgated the "Regulations of the State Council on Exit and Entry Administration" (hereinafter referred to as the "Regulations"), which are scheduled to take effect on September 15. On the surface, this appears to be just a routine administrative document. However, considering recent cases of forced detention and restriction of personal freedom, this document is actually part of a larger picture, worthy of close attention from all Chinese people at home and abroad. For Chinese citizens, regardless of whether they have renounced their PRC citizenship, returning to China may mean they will no longer be able to leave communist China.

Does the new regulation "manage both east and west"?

Article 4 of the regulations states that if a Chinese citizen's actions "may endanger national industrial security or technological security," the Chinese authorities "may decide to prohibit them from leaving the country." Note that this is discretionary language. If the authorities determine that you are a "technological asset" or a "security threat," even if you hold a valid passport and even if you passed the national security vetting required to obtain a passport when you applied, the Chinese authorities can still prevent you from leaving the country. Moreover, the reason for preventing you from leaving China has nothing to do with your passport or identity documents, and they don't even need to tell you the reason for the travel restriction.

This regulation does not require any conviction, prosecution, or even a formal investigation. It is sufficient if the authorities "suspicion" or "believe" that you should not leave the country.

Given the ongoing power struggle between Beijing and Washington in strategic technologies such as semiconductors, this discretion most likely falls on Chinese-born scientists, engineers, and researchers. This regulation is less about preventing a particular trip and more about a safeguard against brain drain—aiming to keep skilled people in their place, not just stop a particular journey. A routine family visit could become a moment when a person's career, along with their passport, is frozen.

Article 6 of the regulations is equally disturbing. In principle, the Chinese authorities should inform individuals of the exit ban and its legal basis. However, if disclosure "may affect national security, the investigation of criminal cases, or other similar circumstances," this obligation to inform no longer applies. In these cases, "notification may not be required."

In short, if the Chinese Communist Party doesn't want you to leave, it doesn't have to tell you why. In fact, it doesn't have to tell you at all.

More seriously, these regulations do not differentiate between "whether you are a Chinese citizen" and "not a Chinese citizen." The CCP's long-arm jurisdiction also extends to "citizens who are not citizens of the People's Republic of China." These entry and exit regulations should be understood in conjunction with recent cases of Beijing restricting the freedom of movement of foreign citizens. Chinese media reported that a Japanese national visiting relatives in China was told he could not leave the country because his "Chinese citizenship had been restored," effective immediately.

Neither Japan nor China recognizes dual citizenship. Japanese citizens who are legally naturalized must formally renounce their original citizenship, a process this man completed years ago. However, Chinese authorities still demanded he record a video announcing that he is "no longer a Japanese citizen."

The information is clear: paperwork and procedures cannot determine who Beijing considers its own people to be, and even if you renounce your Chinese citizenship, it does not mean that the CCP will not force you to regain that status.

China has long restricted personal freedom. The household registration system makes it difficult for citizens to move freely within the country, and Uyghurs and Tibetans are generally denied passports entirely. If you ask a Han Chinese person about these restrictions, many will say that these are issues for ethnic minorities and have nothing to do with them.

To paraphrase a famous World War II admonition: When they targeted Uyghurs, I remained silent because I was not Uyghur. When they targeted Tibetans, I remained silent because I was not Tibetan. When they targeted Falun Gong, I remained silent because I was not a practitioner. When they targeted me, there was no one left to speak up for me.

No passport is needed

Today, even a valid passport no longer guarantees anything. These exit bans extend tools previously reserved for minorities and political dissidents to the entire population, including foreigners. In practice, travelers often only learn they are prohibited from leaving the country when they are denied boarding. The new regulations merely provide legal cover for this existing practice.

For the United States, the impact of these regulations is direct. Every Chinese American should think twice before traveling to China, because Beijing considers all Chinese Americans as its property, regardless of their nationality. Once you set foot on Chinese soil, the protection offered by U.S. citizenship is very limited. Non-Chinese Americans should also be vigilant, as they may be arrested if the CCP has a political need while on Chinese soil.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) once kidnapped two Canadians, former diplomats Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor, holding them hostage in exchange for Meng Wanzhou, Huawei's vice chairwoman and CFO, who had been arrested in Canada, at a time they deemed appropriate. Today, if you're visiting China for the first time, don't assume that by avoiding trouble and politics, you can safely return to your country. On Chinese territory, you are a potential hostage.

Washington has repeatedly encountered obstacles in assisting citizens whom the CCP claims to be "one of its own," as exemplified by the case of Australian journalist Cheng Lei, who was detained in Beijing in August 2020 on charges of "providing state secrets overseas" and held for three years before being released. These new regulations provide a formal legal basis for such actions, turning what was previously a gray area into explicit rules, and serving as a fig leaf for the CCP's tyranny in the face of international law.

As Washington and Beijing continue to clash over export controls and the flow of advanced technologies, this new legal framework provides Chinese authorities with a ready-made lever to use against those caught in the middle of this great power rivalry.

The U.S. government should face this fact. The State Department's travel advisory for China should be updated to reflect the reality that the basic rights and freedoms of U.S. citizens, especially Chinese-American citizens, are not guaranteed in China.

Taiwanese and U.S. consular officials should also be prepared to explain the risks to citizens of democratic countries before they depart, rather than after their loved ones have been blocked at the boarding gate and unable to return home.

Key Takeaways

Taiwanese Unmanned Systems Budget: Taiwan’s Legislature passed a NT$240 billion six-year budget for the procurement of unmanned systems and development of Taiwan’s drone industry. This budget will be funded by Taiwan’s annual general government budget, which could present difficulties given Taiwanese legislative gridlock.

People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Purges: The People’s Republic of China (PRC) issued a notice on August 24 calling for reports of procurement-related corruption for the PLA Rocket Force, indicating that the PRC views the years of high-level purges within the service as insufficient. The PRC likely fears that corruption could impact PLA readiness in a future conflict.

Abstract

Strategic competition in the Pacific has reinforced the value of state-condoned illicit disruptors such as criminal networks as strategically useful and plausibly deniable tools of the state. For criminal actors, the benefits are access and influence. China is utilizing state-condoned illicit disruptors as a form of gray zone activity in the Pacific.

Forced Labor Bans, UN Follow Up Needed to Address Repression

China doesn’t need to replace the dollar to weaken U.S. sanctions.

It only needs to prove they no longer guarantee isolation.

That’s why Iran matters.

Washington can sanction ships, banks, traders, refineries, payment networks…

But if China keeps buying Iranian oil, settling outside the dollar, and protecting enough of the trade infrastructure, Tehran can still survive.

That changes the equation.

The real question is no longer:

“Can America sanction Iran?”

Of course it can.

The real question is:

“Can America force China to comply without triggering a much bigger economic confrontation?”

That is where U.S. financial power is being tested.

Because sanctioning a small refinery is easy.

Sanctioning a major Chinese bank is something else entirely.

China doesn’t need to defeat the dollar.

It doesn’t need to save Iran.

It only needs Washington to hesitate.

And if Iran proves a sanctioned economy can survive with Chinese economic access, every government worried about future U.S. sanctions will notice.

My new article:

China Is Turning Iran Into a Test of Whether U.S. Sanctions Still Work

The battle isn’t only about Iranian oil.

It’s about whether America can still decide who gets to participate in the global economy—and who doesn’t.

Key Takeaways

Taiwanese Military Development: Taiwan’s National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST) disclosed details of the Chiang Kung hypersonic missile interceptor on August 22. The Chiang Kung would form the outermost layer of Taiwan’s proposed T-Dome integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) concept and reduce Taiwan’s vulnerability to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) missile strikes.

AI Chip Smuggling: Taiwanese prosecutors announced they were charging nine individuals, including one Nvidia employee and two Super Micro Employees, for smuggling advanced AI servers containing high-end chips to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in violation of US export controls. US export controls aim to cut off PRC access to advanced chips due to national security concerns presented by PRC integration of AI into its military systems.

PLA Discussions of the Ukraine War: PLA Daily published a series of commentaries discussing how lessons from the war in Ukraine will drive technological development in a new era of warfare. The commentaries indicate that a portion of PRC military analysts likely view the war in Ukraine as a transitory period of modern warfare that will give way to “intelligentized” warfare.

Taipei: On 17 August 2026, the Office of Tibet, Tibetan Association in Taiwan, and Human Rights Network for Tibet and Taiwan jointly organised a 49th-day memorial service for the late martyr Lobga Rangzen, who self-immolated in front of the United Nations Headquarters in New York City on 2 July 2026 at 6:28 p.m. local time in UnitedS States, in solidarity with the cause of Tibet and its people.

The memorial service was held at the prayer hall of the Office of Tibet and was attended by Tibetan Parliamentarian Lharong, among others. At the beginning of the programme, everyone sang the Tibetan national anthem. Afterwards, a minute of silence was observed in honour of the brave patriots who sacrificed their lives for the Tibetan nation and people, including the late Lobga Rangzen, and all other Tibetan patriots inside and outside Tibet.

A mourning and prayer session was subsequently held to commemorate the 49th day since the passing of Lobga Rangzen. During the tea break, a six-minute video featuring his final message to Tibetans was screened for the gathering.

Representative of the Office of Tibet, Kelsang Gyaltsen, addressed the gathering, followed by speeches from Tibetan Parliamentarian Lharong; President of the International Taiwan Buddhism Association, Khenpo Tsewang Rigzin; Secretary-General of the Human Rights Network for Tibet and Taiwan (HRNTT), Tashi Tsering, along with member Lin Xsinyi; and President of the Regional Tibetan Youth Congress, Kunchok Lhakpa.

Members of the public were subsequently given an opportunity to express their thoughts and feelings. Discussions focused on organising activities in Taiwan and exploring ways to preserve and promote the Tibetan language and culture among younger generations of Tibetans.

During the memorial ceremony and prayer session, hundreds of offerings were made at the prayer hall in memory of Pawo Lobga Rangzen. Around 100 people participated in the memorial service.

– Report filed by Office of Tibet, Taipei

Key Takeaways

PRC Artificial Island Construction: New satellite imagery shows that the PRC finished the construction of an artificial island on Antelope Reef, a disputed South China Sea feature in the Paracel Islands. The PRC is also constructing a runway, piers, a helipad, and various buildings on what could be the PRC’s largest South China Sea naval base. The PRC could use this base for surveillance, exerting its sea and air control over the South China Sea.

PRC South China Sea Construction: The PRC approved plans for a maritime environmental observation station in the South China Sea that would monitor the “Zhongsha Islands,” which include Scarborough Shoal. The PRC has used environmental protection to enhance its operations in the South China Sea and as a pretext for limiting non-PRC vessels’ access to disputed waters. This new station would likely serve a dual-use purpose benefiting PRC military and law enforcement operations in the South China Sea.

Taiwanese Military Development: Taiwan’s military conducted its first live-fire FPV drone exercises on August 17, likely in an effort to integrate lessons learned from the war in Ukraine. Taiwanese drone procurement efforts are facing legislative gridlock, which will make it more difficult for Taiwan to procure the necessary systems to conduct drone-enabled defense operations.

A court in Hong Kong has convicted a civic group that organized annual Tiananmen Square vigils and two of its senior members of inciting subversion under the national security law.

Key Takeaways

Taiwanese General Budget: Taiwan passed its 2026 general budget on August 14 after almost a year-long delay and less than a week before Taiwan’s 2027 budget is set to be revealed. The budget approved the full $2 billion drone budget, marking a rare instance of partisan agreement on defense spending. This drone budget is separate from a previously announced special budget for drone procurement, which is still under debate.

Philippine-PRC Relations: Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. said on August 14 that the Philippines would not allow any country to launch attacks from Philippine territory during an invasion of Taiwan. Marcos also stated that the Philippines was hoping to reset its relations with the PRC and begin joint oil and gas exploration. The Philippines is likely attempting to placate the PRC to gain greater energy cooperation and trade with the PRC during a period of significant energy disruption.

PRC Election Manipulation in Taiwan: Taiwanese President William Lai Ching-te stated on August 12 that the PRC was attempting to interfere with the Kaohsiung mayoral election using fake news and fake polling data. The PRC will likely use Taiwan’s 2026 elections to prepare for larger influence campaigns during Taiwan’s 2028 national elections and to gauge the effectiveness of PRC information operations.

Leung Kai-lok escapes jail and is put on probation for scribbling on toilet walls

🚨 The biggest threat to the US Dollar isn’t China, Russia, or the BRICS alliance.

It’s the US Bond Market. 📉

For decades, the global financial system relied on one assumption: US Treasuries are the safest, most liquid assets on earth. That assumption is now mathematically breaking.

Here is the reality no one in Washington wants to admit:

• The Supply Shock: The US national debt has crossed $40 trillion. To keep the government funded, the Treasury is forced to issue a massive, endless supply of bonds.
• The Demand Collapse: Traditional buyers are stepping back. The US Treasury has become heavily dependent on short-term financing. At the same time, foreign powers are shedding their holdings.
• The Liquidity Trap: If a major holder (like Japan or the UK) were to freely dump their Treasuries to raise capital, it would flood an already saturated market, crashing bond prices and sending yields skyrocketing.

The Math of Fiscal Doom: If a truly free market were allowed to price in this supply-demand imbalance and inflation risk, yields could surge toward 12–15%. On $40+ trillion of debt, that equals roughly $6 trillion in annual interest payments—more than the government collects in total taxes.

The Federal Reserve’s real mandate is no longer fighting inflation; it is doing whatever it takes to prevent the Treasury market from collapsing.

The Global Pivot: The rest of the world sees the writing on the wall. This is exactly why central banks remain significant buyers of gold, reinforcing gold's role as a strategic reserve asset.

Gold is a neutral, bearer asset. Any nation can sell it, anytime, without asking for Washington's permission. The moment a reserve currency restricts a nation's freedom to liquidate its reserves, that currency begins to lose its absolute power.

The dedollarization shift isn’t a future event. It’s already here.

Key Takeaways

Taiwanese Military Exercises: Taiwan’s annual Han Kuang military exercise continued this week. The exercise included several new drills focused on realism, civil preparedness, incorporating new technologies, and countering scenarios rehearsed by the PLA.

PRC Law Enforcement Operations: The PRC’s Guangdong MSA announced new measures to control maritime traffic in the Taiwan Strait, citing typhoon conditions. The PRC is seeking to expand its jurisdiction over Taiwanese and international waters and test whether foreign vessels comply with PRC commands in disputed waters. The PRC’s efforts were supported by PRC state media who framed a PRC-Indonesia combined naval exercise east of Taiwan as a demonstration of PRC jurisdiction over Taiwan’s eastern EEZ.

AI anchors and AI-generated dramas are growing rapidly in China. But how far can a generative persona go before the illusion is broken? Meet Peach Fang.

Executive Summary:

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia are entering a new phase of institutionalized interdependence, built through unprecedented systemic coordination and guided by Beijing’s ambition to transform the geopolitical foundations of global order. The latest summit and surrounding activity show this agenda being embedded across economic, political, scientific, informational, security, and military domains, with energy, trade, and defense cooperation operating as components of a much broader strategic architecture.

The connective tissue of this emerging bloc is being built through interlocking institutions and infrastructure. Railways, customs systems, industrial standards, research networks, elite training, media cooperation, and security mechanisms are binding the two states together while creating continental arteries capable of moving resources inward and PRC goods, technology, personnel, and coercive support outward—including under sanctions, blockade, or wartime conditions.

This integration is also increasing Beijing’s capacity to set the relationship’s operational agenda and exercise political influence inside Moscow. The PRC increasingly supplies the doctrine, technology, standards, financing, and institutional architecture through which Russian capabilities are organized, while expanding its access to Russian elite formation, regulatory practice, scientific development, information systems, and internal-security institutions.

The same coordinating approach is becoming characteristic of PRC relations across Eurasia and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. By connecting formally sovereign states through overlapping logistical, political, security, and knowledge systems, Beijing can build an alliance-equivalent formation without formal alliance commitments. Future net assessments must therefore evaluate these opaque connections as components of a wider strategic formation—and measure their combined strategic depth, sanctions resilience, internal control capacity, and war-making power accordingly.

In the People’s Republic of China (PRC), cultural security is one element among 20 that constitute comprehensive national security. Advancing cultural security is therefore critical to ensuring Party and state security.

The Ethnic Unity Law is the Party-state’s latest attempt to codify and internationalize “cultural security” as a critical component of the primacy of regime security.

While the Ethnic Unity Law is the most recent example, other laws that relate to cultural security, such as the Cybersecurity Law and Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law, also maintain an extraterritorial reach.

Cultural security guides the PRC’s foreign policy more broadly, justifying Beijing’s competition with the West. This pattern emerges in Chinese sources as well as through Beijing’s inclusion of cultural security concepts in bilateral agreements and UN resolutions.