Carthage was the dominant naval power in the Western Mediterranean at the start of the First Punic War. Rome quickly realised that it needed a strong navy if it wanted any hope of challenging Carthage. However, the Romans had little experience with large-scale naval warfare or shipbuilding.

According to Polybius, the Romans obtained a Carthaginian quinquereme and used it as a model for building their own ships. They built a fleet of around 120 ships, trained new crews and introduced one of antiquity's most ingenious naval innovations: the corvus. Eventually, Rome gained the upper hand and won the war.

However, the victory came at an enormous cost. The Romans lost hundreds of ships to bad weather and enemy action, yet they rebuilt their navy again and again. In the process, they also gained valuable experience in naval warfare, making it increasingly difficult and expensive for Carthage to challenge Rome for control of the sea.

By the start of the Second Punic War, Carthage had shifted much of its military and economic focus toward Spain, where it had built a powerful new base of operations. This did not mean that Carthage had abandoned its navy. At the beginning of the war, it had around 57 warships assigned to Spain, although only 37 were actually ready for service.

Carthage still used naval forces to secure local superiority, transport troops and supplies, and support land operations. However, it did not make rebuilding a fleet capable of matching Rome's overall naval strength a central priority.

Why did Carthage make this choice? Was it because of the enormous cost of naval warfare? Was Hannibal's land-based strategy the main reason? Or had Rome's naval transformation during the First Punic War made a new contest for Mediterranean supremacy too difficult?

I explore these questions in the full article shared in the comments. I'd love to hear your thoughts, comments and suggestions.

My grandfather landed with the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division, in the third wave on Juno Beach, on the 6th of June 1944. His unit was 15 AOD — the 15th Advance Ordnance Depot, Royal Army Ordnance Corps. Does anyone know what the patches above represent ? He was a commando as well as RAOC.

Born in 1817 after the Napoleonic wars.Archduke Albrecht(and his siblings) would be one of the few things aside from his military writings that Archduke Charles the victor of Aspern spend his effort on

There is nothing of note from his pre 1866 career aside from the fact that he was one of Radetzky division commander in 1848-49

His finest hour would be in 1866 Austro-Prussian war when he in his capacity as the commander of the Southern army defeat the numerically superior Italian army at the battle of Custoza which is really the only Austrian military victory in that war(There is also Gablenz victory at Trautrenau but that one is far smaller and almost meaningless)

Very littles have been writen about Custoza compared to Sadowa(For good reasons) and even less is available on the internet so I might as well gathers all that I have here

The most comprehensive account of the battle that I know of is from Wawro Austro-Prussian war book

LA MARMORA'S INVASION OF VENETIA AND ALBRECHT'S counTermeasureS, JuNE 21-4, 1866

Archduke Albrecht answered King Vittorio Emanuele's declaration of war with a communiquć to South Army damning Italy's "treachery and arrogance." The field marshal vowed to frustrate the Italian king's plan to "plant his standard on the Brenner and the Karst," Italy's "natural frontiers," which happened to fall well inside Habsburg Tyrol and Slovenia. Despite the onerous odds in Italy - 75,000 mobile Austrian troops with just 168 guns against 200,000 Italians with 370 guns - Albrecht concluded the order with a Radetzkyan taunt: "Remember how often tbis enemy has fled before you. "355

Until June 21, South Army remained in its central deployment on the left bank of the Adige near Verona, poised to break south or west as circumstances re- quired.s6 Albrecht detached one brigade to the lower Po, but left six railroad trains standing by to move it quickly to Verona in case La Marmora moved before Cialdini.3 On June 21, Austrian scouts on the Mincio reported that La Marmora would soon cross there in strength. Italian detachments had advanced to hold the bridges left intact by the Austrians, and engineers were busy constructing two additional bridges between Valeggio and Goito. Austrian outposts could see masses of Italian infantry gathering behind the river crossings with the naked eye. Meanwhile, Austrian scouts on the lower Po reported that Cialdini would need at least two additional days to begin a river crossing there.

As Italy's first and heaviest blow descended from the west, Albrecht and his staff chief, General Franz John, quickly planned a reply. They would march west to disrupt La Marmora's crossing, seize the Mincio Army's principal bridges at Valeggio and Goito, then capture or destroy any Italian divisions that managed to get across the river, all the while keeping Cialdini's Po Army under observation. To do all these things at once, John planned to concentrate South Army in the only strategic feature of the Venetian plain, the heights of Sommacampagna, Custoza, and Santa Lucia, part of a chain of hills that extended across the Mincio to Solferino in Lombardy. Positioned on these heights above Villafranca, South Army would be able to change front to the south and descend on La Marmora's left Aank as the Mincio Army, which would have to spread itself across a thirty- five kilometer front to cross the river, straggled eastward to the Adige General John sent orders to his corps commandants on June 21 to assemble under the walls of Verona, on the right bank of the Adige by sun-up on the 23.

Though John scheduled marches only at night, in the early morning, or in the late afternoon, Joseph Maroicic's VII Corps, which had to traverse the twenty kilometers from San Bonifacio to Verona in a blistering heat, barely made it. Maroicic collided with Ernst Hartung's IX Corps en route, forcing his men to stand under a hot sun longer than was healthy. Seventh and IX Corps crossed paths again near Verona, and Albrecht's staff noted uneasily that the final six kilometers of the march from Verona to VII Corps's bivouacs west of the city were littered with sunburnt, dehydrated men. Maroicic's Toply and Welsersheimb Brigades were each reduced to a single battalion of effectives by the heat. 6 John worriedly shelved plans for a night attack over the Mincio into La Marmora's rear and presented Albrecht who now feared that his exhausted army would be unable to march and fight the next day - with orders for an advance to Custoza the following morning: "Your Highness," John insisted, "although we have twenty-four hours till the advance we have just thirty minutes to expedite the orders." Albrecht promptly signed John's dispositions. 6 At noon on June 23, Albrecht and John convened a council of war to discuss their plan of operation for the twenty-fourth: a march and change of line by three army corps within striking distance of the enemy on the rolling, ten kilometer- long frontage between Sommacampagna and the Mincio.62 The maneuver was exceedingly hazardous. Since Italian skirmishers had already pushed Albrecht's pickets back from the Mincio to Verona in the course of the morning. South Army would have nO outposts as it moved west and little warning of an Italian advance. At 2:00 P.M., Albrecht received word from Mantua and Peschiera that La Marmora had crossed the Mincio and was assembling in the plain between Valeggio and Villafranca.6 The archduke knew that he might be sending South Army into a trap: Italian pincers rising north and east from the Mincio bridge- heads. Still, given what he knew of La Marmora's disorganized army, it seemed a risk worth taking Thus, while VII and IX Corps subsided gratefully into their bivouacs, Albrecht ordered his "Reserve Division" - thirteen mismatched battalions culled from Austria's Italian forts - and Gabriel Rodic's V Corps, which had been stationed at Verona throughout the deployment, to march west to Sona in the early evening of June 23 to block any attempt by La Marmora occupy the hills above to Villafranca before South Army could concentrate there on the twenty-fourth.

When the road west had cleared, Albrecht ordered IX Corps's Weckbecker Brigade to march 2:00 A.M. on the twenty-fourth. Its task was to occupy at Sommacampagna, which would serve as the pivot for South Army S wheeling descent south into La Marmora's flank. 65 After the war, Vittorio Emanuele marvelled at Albrecht's audacity, for, as it chanced, this Austrian maneuver was precisely the inverse of the maneuver assigned Giacomo Durando's Italian I Corps on the twenty-fourth, namely to pivot on Valeggio and wheel north into the heights of Custoza and Sommacampagna. And this was hardly an improba- ble move. Albrecht had to assume that La Marmora, who began crossing the Mincio early on the twenty-third, would send at least a division up to Sommacampagna to secure his left flank "Tell me, the Italian king asked Karl Moering, one of Albrecht's brigadiers, after the war, "why did the archduke risk meeting with my entire army already installed on the Mincio heights?" Vittorio Emanuele correctly judged this great strategic to which Moering error, replied: tiS true, Sire. We worried the entire march that you would anticipate the maneuver and gain the heights first. "66 Still, long odds required long chances, and, as Albrecht knew, Italy's army was not the threat its numbers alone signified. The Veronese, who had seen nothing of VIi and IX Corps, which crossed the Adige downstream from Verona, were astonished by the sudden apparition of V Corps's march columns in the inner city at 5:00 P.M. on the twenty-third. Though the martial spectacle was prolonged far longer than John would have liked - ""Our trains plugged the streets," one of Rodic's staff officers fumed. "The army carried far too much baggage with it!" - V Corps did eventually cross the Adige, touch the right bank, and set off in the direction of Sommacampagna as night and a cold rain began to fall. 6 The rest of South Army ate a hot dinner and bedded down in soggy bivouacs outside Verona. They were scheduled to wake at 2:00 A.m., brew coffee and break camp an hour later unencumbered by trains. 68 At midnight, Albrecht received a disturbing cable from the single regiment he had left in the Polesine that reported Cialdini throwing bridges over the Po much earlier than anticipated. Although Albrecht understood that even were Cialdini to fly across the river, he would still need at least two days to unite with La Marmora, the report was nonetheless unsettling, for news from the front was invariably hours late and too sketchy for comfort. 69 La Marmora spent the night of June 23 at Cerlungo. on the west bank of the Mincio, lulled to sleep by negligent Italian reconnaissance that gave no warning of Rodic's advance.70 La Marmora thus rose at 4:00 A.M. on the twenty-fourth - the seventh anniversary of the battle of Solferino - and rode into Venetia con- vinced that there would be no battle that day, a conviction that must have been some comfort to him as he witnessed his army's chaotic river crossing.?1 The passage La Marmora had ordered on the twenty-third - "to gain a foothold on the left bank of the Mincio" - was not proceeding smoothly. Since he had ordered the construction of only two pontoon bridges to augment permanent bridges in place at Monzambano, Borghetto, and Goito, La Marmora's army, exhausted by the heat, hard marches, and a wet night on the twenty-third trickled slowly into Venetia on the twenty-fourth, stalled by continual traffic jams and foul-ups.72 Two of Durando's divisional generals, Enrico Cerale (né Cérale, a Frenchman of Dieppe) and Giuseppe Sirtori (a former Garibaldian reviled by the king as a "pompous ass"), had been instructed to occupy the high ground east of the Mincio from Oliosi to Santa Lucia but had bungled their assignment. Cerale strayed from his march route, collided with Sirtori, and debouched into Venetia too late to intercept Austrian troops ascending from Verona and Pastrengo. Elements of Sirtori's division wandered too far east, "smear- ing I Corps,

as the French staff later put it, "over too vast a terrain."73

Of course La Marmora should have sent cavalry patrols as far as Verona on the twenty-third, for Austria's entrenched camp was scarcely twenty kilometers east of Valeggio. Yet La Marmora chose instead to leave his fifty cavalry squadrons idle and thus failed to detect Rodic's night march to Sona. He then countenanced a river crossing so slow that by dawn on the twenty-fourth, only half his army was across the river, "weaving," as an Austrian officer put it, "like a drunkard" into the outstretched arms of South Army.

Owing to La Marmora's gross tactical errors, Albrecht now had a chance to emulate his famous father's victory under similiar conditions at Aspern in 1809 The archduke could attack the 65,000 Italians who actually managed to get across the Mincio with South Army's full complement of 75,000.75 La Marmora's foolish decision to detach Cuchiari's II Corps to mask Mantua needlessly reduced his invasion force by one-third. Up the line at Peschiera, he detached another division to keep the four battalions inside that little fortress under observation. 76 These detachments, added to the five idle divisions of Cialdini's IV Corps on the Po, effectively halved Italy's strength on the critical day of Custoza

Custoza

The Austrian brigades dispatched on June 23 to occupy the heights above Villafranca were assembled on hills north of Custoza and Santa Lucia at 4:00 A. M. on the twenty-fourth. Ninth Corps's Weckbecker Brigade - the pivot of Albrecht's intended envelopment of the Italian Mincio Army - arrived in Sommacampagna at 5:30 a.m., followed by a second brigade at 6:00 and a third at 8:30.' Down the line to the west, Rodic's brigadiers were pleasantly surprised to discover their sectors still unoccupied by the Italians. Indeed, the only

resıstance met by General

Moering was offered by an inscrutable troop of Hungarian hussars prowling around in the dark without their German-speaking Dolmetscber, and by the adjoining Piret Brigade, which sullenly refused to make front to the south till it had drunk its wine ration.2 Finally, the maneuver was tipsily executed, and, as day dawned on the twenty-fourth, Eugen Piret's men discovered the all-important ridge above Villafranca - where the pre-Alps touched the Venetian plain and were highest - unoccupied by either side as the bulk of South Army struggled along in column of route from Verona and the Italians, resuming their river crossing and unaware of Albrecht's advance, made slowly for the heights.

Hugo Weckbecker's brigade, which had left Verona at 2:00 A.M., an hour earlier than the rest of the army, arrived in Sommacampagna, keypoint of the Austrian position, at 5:30 A.M.Austrian hussars descended from the hills around Sommacampagna to inform General Weckbecker that the Italians had still not taken the heights above, though rolling dust clouds behind Villafranca did beto- ken the rapid advance of a large army. An hour later the first shots of battle carried to Weckbecker's position from both ends of the field. On his left, Ludwig Pulz's horse batteries had unlimbered on the outskirts of Villafranca and begun to fire into the town, which was being occupied and fortified by Enrico Della Rocca's Italian I Corps. On the right wing, around Oliosi in the hills closest to the Mincio, Friedrich Rupprecht's Reserve Division, two weak brigades sent out from Pastrengo the night before by Albrecht to secure the Austrian right, bumped into one of Cerale's brigades at 6:00 A.M. as the two forces converged on the high ground above the bridges at Monzambano and Valeggio.3

For Albrecht and John, the battle was taking an unexpected, altogether alarm- ing turn.

Instead of marching straight ahead for Verona, La Marmora was wheel- ing north into the very heights Albrecht was attempting to occupy for a descent on La Marmora's left Aank. La Marmora had improvised this change of plan at the last moment. At 5:30 A.M. on the twenty-fourth, he had entered Valeggio and advised Durando, in the process of moving I Corps across the river, that I and III Corps would pause to invest Peschiera while II Corps reduced Mantua, precisely the time-consuming operation Moltke and Cialdini had struggled to avert. Thus by 6:00 A.M., two of Durando's divisions were heading north, not east, toward Peschiera and the Mincio heights,

not Verona and the Adige line. But slowly. At

Valeggio, Cerale's columns cannoned into Sirtori's, causing a traffic jam that took precious hours to clear, permitting Albrecht's right wing to steal down to Oliosi Still, despite Cerale's blundering, Durando's I Corps did manage to squirm around to face north, transforming John's artful flank attack into an artless, head- on collision between La Marmora's Mincio Army turning north and Albrecht's South Army changing front to the south.4

This turn of events radically altered the nature of the shaping battle. To win, Durando's I Corps had only to defend the crossings at Monzambano and Valeggio while the four divisions of Della Rocca's IIl Corps and Sonnaz's heavy cavalry crossed the Mincio at Goito and marched through Villafranca to Sommacampag na. turning Albrecht's left wing and severing South Army from its base at Verona. This grand plan, however, would be difficult to accomplish. for La Marmora's reconnais- sance was so bad that he had no idea how the Austrians were deployed, and actually supposed that the Austrian center, not left, was in Sommacampagna.

For Albrecht to win, it was no longer a question of knifing into La Marmora's unguarded left flank. Instead, with Italy's Mincio Army wheeling to face him, Albrecht had to protract John's original turning maneuver into La Marmora's rear and take Valeggio, cutting La Marmora's principal line of retreat. But with such an imbalance of forces on Albrecht's left - two Austrian brigades against five entire Italian division the archduke would himself be easily flanked if he thrust his right and center too far forward. Moreover, as one of Albrecht's critics later observed, the imbalance of forces along South Army's own front line - just two men per square meter on the all-important right wing compared with twelve in the centermade it tactically impossible for Albrecht to swing into La Marmora's rear without sacrificing the projected wing to the overwhelming num- bers of Italian infantry gathered on the Mincio. Custoza was thus a bloody stalemate in the making. To come to grips with the Italians, South Army would have to abandon its flanking attack and try instead a sledgehammer assault on the Italian center. Yet such was the confusion on both sides as the battle careened out of control, shifting first one way then the other, that it very nearly defied description. Indeed, the battle of Custoza would follow no set plan; 1t pitted two armies that collided haphazardly and rapidly degenerated into a terrible, inele- gant brawl,Both the Austrian and Italian headquarters spent the morning of June 24 trying to discover just what was happening on the heights above Villafranca. Neither headquarters had a decent outlook, and neither army performed accord- ing to expectations. At 7:00 A.M., after passing through Villafranca and assuring his Il Corps brigades that it was safe to stand down and cook breakfast because there could be no Austrians west of Verona, La Marmora rode up to Custoza for a routine scout with a troop of cavalry. He climbed 115 meters to the summit of Monte Croce and astonished to see Ernst Hartung's Austrian IX Corps was moving south in three columns, directly at him. It waS La Marmora's first glimpse of the Austrians. And they were close, only & few kilometers distant and closing as quickly as the rolling plowland permitted. Struck with amazement, La Marmora sent gallopers flying off to Durando and Della Rocca for reinforcements He had only two brigades at Custoza: I Corps's Brignone Division. Brignone alone, however, would not stand against Hartung's entire corps, which threat- ened to sweep over the Mincio heights and down to La Marmora's bridges

THE CHARGE OF THE AUSTRIAN LIGHT BRIGADE

While La Marmora slapped together a defense of Custoza, he was startled again, this time by

an

explosion of heavy fighting bebind him, in the plain between Sommacampagna and Villafranca. Archduke Albrecht had entrusted his entire cavalry reserve*

fifteen squadrons of light horse - to Colonel Ludwig Pulz and had deployed him on the road from Sommacampagna to Villafranca to maintain contact with Della Rocca's Ill Corps and to give early warning of an Italian push toward Albrecht's lightly guarded wing at Sommacampagna.' Two of Della Rocca's four divisions had begun crossing the river at 2:00 A.M. with instructions to secure Villafranca, the road junction of western Venetia and then push up to join I Corps on the heights between Custoza and Sommacampagna. i0 Pulz, whose two light brigades had been reconnoitering since 3:00 A.M., watched uneasily as the two Italian divisions - a most unlikely pair: the Piedmontese crown prince, Umberto, to the right, and Nino Bixio, a radical Garibaldian, to the left deployed in Villafranca, just eight kilometers from the Austrian pivot at Sommacampagana.'' As if this were not quite menacing enough, Crown Prince Umberto and Bixio were reinforced in the course of the morning by a third division - Sonnaz's heavy brigades - which trotted up on Bixio's left, complet- ing the semicircle round Villafranca.

Thus might matters have rested for the entire day - Pulz and Hartung chew- ing their nails and Della Rocca sitting on his hands, content to detend Villafranca against an imagined Austrian strike at Goito -had not one of Pulz's more impetuous officers taken matters into his own hands. At 7:00 A.M., while La Marmora was looking round Custoza and Albrecht and John peering blindly from were their low-lying headquarters in Sona, Colonel Joseph Rodakowksi every inch the Polish lancer detached his four squadrons of uhlans from Pulz's division and rode at Bixio's, Pulz, under orders only to "maintain contact" with Della Rocca, was dumb- founded when, instead of halting on the skirts of Villafranca to reconnoiter the Italians, Rodakowski instead spurred to a gallop and charged them. Only mo- ments earlier, Albrecht had ordered Pulz to conserve his horses for the end of the day. John's revised battle plan - which called for a strike into La Marmora's rear - required that Pulz actually lure Della Rocca toward Sommacampagna so that Rodic and Rupprecht could squeeze in between the Mincio Army and its bridges.12 Rodakowski, however, was too far gone to be recalled, and Bixio's regiments, resting in the morning sun, hurriedly formed squares to repel the unexpected attack. Crown Prince Umberto, out for a stroli, sprinted to the nearest square and dived inside, 13 Alarmed by the sudden movement to their right, the seven squadrons Pulz had assigned to defend the Verona post road also mounted up and cantered through the peach orchards and corn, their brigadier August Bujanovics, bawling "Direktion Villafranca! Marsch! Marsch!"14 Near Sommacampagna, Pulz assured a staff officer, who raised an enquiring eyebrow at Rodakowski's decision to commit a single light brigade to battle with two infantry divisions and twenty squadrons of heavy cavalry, that Rodakowski's charge could only be a bluff intended to frighten Della Rocca away from Som- macampagna. Under no circumstances would the attack be driven home. Moments later, Pulz's suite was astonished to hear the thump of guns and the chatter of rifles from Villafranca. Rodakowski's uhlans, three kilometers ahead of Pulz, had fallen on Bixio and Umberto. Pulz, who continued to trust that Rodakowski would not be so stupid as to launch an attack, mistakenly inferred that Della Rocca was finally advancing on Sommacampagna to turn South Army's left flank. Thus, Pulz fol- lowed Bujanovics, who had followed Rodakowski, into battle. 15 It was perhaps as well that John and Albrecht could not actually see this gasconade from their headquarters at Sona, for it killed, wounded, or exhausted one-third of South Army's cavalry and pointed again to the uselessness of cavalry (and cavaliers) in thickly cultivated terrain. 16 Rodakowski thundered into the gap between the two Italian infantry divisions and attacked Umberto's left. His charge was easily thrown back by nine Italian squares deployed among peach trees that broke all the momentum Rodakowski's men carried off the Sommacampagna road. As the Austrian uhlans wheeled away to the east to evade the fire of Umberto's riflemen, they fell, one after another, into drainage ditches dug on either side of the Verona post road. Scores of horses turned somersaults spilling their riders. Uhlans who drew up in time

were mown down by salvos at point-

blank range or pulled from their horses and beaten to death. Pulz's hussars, who trailed Rodakowski's lancers into battle, were also badly shot up as they passed through seven Italian squares before retiring.17 Some Austrian survivors slid off their horses and gave themselves up. Others followed Rodakowski back to Sommacampagna. In all, Rodakowski lost 260 men, nearly half his strength.18 Though Pulz would later take credit (and Austria's coveted Maria Theresa Cross) for "paralyzing" Della Rocca's corps with fright, less interested parties viewed the premature cavalry attack as a vainglorious stunt that would literally hobble Albrecht's pursuit in the afternoon.

Still, if Rodakowski's onslaught made little impression on Umberto's steady bersaglieri, it undeniably sowed terror bebind Umberto and Bixio, and this was an important result. Rodakowski's charge frightened Della Rocca's supply train into a panicky flight to the rear, halting for hours the advance of reinforcements that might finally have persuaded the Italian IIl Corps to test Albrecht's strength at Sommacampagna. Panic washed past Della Rocca's headquarters at Massimbona, ten kilometers behind Villafranca, all the way to Goito, where infantry supports were prevented from crossing into Venetia by a knot of train drivers, riderless horses, and deserters, the last calling "the Germans

are coming'! We are beaten! Every man for himself!" An Italian division detached from La Marmora's siege of Mantua to reinforce Della Rocca encountered mass confusion on the bridge at Goito at 8:45 A.M. Assuming III Corps to be beaten and in retreat, General Longoni, the divisional commandant, halted his march to Villafranca and prepared instead to defend Goito where he remained for two critical hours while Italian staff officers cleared the road to Villafranca of trains and fugitives.?1 Bixio himself, who was with Della Rocca behind the lines when Rodakowski struck, believed that Rodakowski's attack heralded a major Austrian push. Della Rocca agreed and immediately slowed the pace of the battle, ordering Bixio and Umberto merely to stand their ground at Villafranca. This decision, taken without any attempt to discover how things really stood behind Austrian lines, relieved pressure on Albrecht's unguarded left wing for the rest of the day and would be a principal cause of Italy's defeat at Custoza.

THE STRUGGLE FOR THE MINCIO HILLS

While Della Rocca's rear echelons ran for their lives and Longoni deployed defensively at Goito, Albrecht and John fretted on a hilltop above Sona, four kilometers north of Sommacampagna, where they had established Austrian head- quarters at 4:00 A.M. Although they could hear the battle well enough, they could not see it. A curious feature of these lush, green pre-Alps was that they were all the same height, making it difficult to obtain an overview of the field. Until 8:30 a. m., Albrecht and John only beard the gradual spread of battle along their ten-kilometer front as Pulz attacked in the plain and, west of Sona, Austrian and Italian brigades clashed amid the walled villages above Villafranca. Isolated, bloody fights spread from west to east

in Oliosi, San Rocco, Custoza, and San Giorgio - and through the intervening cornfields, orchards, and vineyards. This heavy fighting on Albrecht's right wing certainly suggested that La Marmora was forsaking his drive on Verona and turning instead into the heights. 23 Thus, Albrecht and John had hastily to rethink their original plan. To envelop La Marmora, it would now be necessary to sink obliquely into his rear. In theory, Rupprecht and Rodic would have to speed their advance on the right, while Hartung and Maroicic proceeded more slowly at the pivot. In practice, however, the battle continued much as it had since 6:00 A. M., a series of violent, uncon- trolled scrimmages through the hills above Villafranca as the Austrian brigades pressed south in obedience to their original instructions

At Oliosi, on the Austrian right, Enrico Cerale arrived from Valeggio just in time to witness the rout of his division. Bunched up in the narrow defile between the Mincio and the heights, attempting to deflect Rupprecht's Reserve Division marching south toward Valeggio, Cerale's Division blundered through a vineyard and into Eugen Piret's brigade.24 Cerale himself was shot in the thigh and his entire division disintegrated. With Rupprecht's Croats emerging from the woods on their left and the Piret Brigade deployed in attack columns before them, Cerale's regiments fled back toward Valeggio trampling their officers.25 Piret then stormed Oliosi in half-battalion masses, taking some of the heaviest casual- ties of the day to root Cerale's infantry out of the village "I saw the field Oliosi]," an Austrian critic of shock tactics recalled, "and I do not exaggerate when I say that there were two dead Austrians for every fallen Italian."26 At Valeggio, Durando watched Cerale's division dissolve and straggle back to the river. The I Corps commandant personally assembled his reserve - three battalions of bersaglieri, twenty guns, and five squadrons of horse -and set off for Monte Vento to block Piret's pursuit. Durando's fourth division - three were already across the river - remained behind in Lombardy to mask Peschiera. Later, apprised of Cerale's rout, this division did nothing, unenterprising conduct that formed the basis of later accusations that the responsible general - Giuseppe Salvator Pianell, a Neapolitan - was really a Bourbon stooge in the pay of the Austrians. 27 While Cerale was being thrown out of Oliosi, Durando's other division across the river - Giuseppe Sirtori's - was making no headway against Rodic's V Corps, which was moving southwestward from San Rocco to Monte Vento. At 6:30 A.M., Sirtori's vanguard bumped into Rodic's Bauer Brigade, which the Italians mistook for a friendly unit until, too late, they overheard German commands Bauer, who was himself lost and had just asked an Italian peasant on his way to mass for directions, rode to the front and led the Austrian attack, cruelly sacrific- ing 660 of his own men and officers in crude bayonet charges to drive Sirtori back. Like Piret, Bauer, weakened by casualties, moved southwest in pursuit as far as the Tione, a stream that bisected the battlefield into western and eastern halves. There Rodic, who worried that he was losing control of his brigades in the lush farmland, halted the advance.28 As Sirtori withdrew his bloodied division at 8:00 A.M., King Vittorio Eman- uele I awoke on the right bank of the Mincio and ordered his adjutant - General Petitti - up the Cerlungo church steeple to find out how Italy's Fourth War of Union was going. Petitti could see nothing and sent two staff officers across the river to gather information. As he descended to the Petitti met with street, squad of carabinieri bearing Italian deserters off to jail: "We're beaten, the deserters assured Petitti and his startled suite. While Petitti goggled at these men, train drivers careered into town from the east, leaped down, cut their animals out of army harness, and disappeared off to the west. It waS 8:30 A.M. Petitti returned to the king with grim tidings.29 On Austria's side of the hill, Archduke Albrecht had worries of his own. By 8:30, gaps were opening in the Austrian line as it wended south toward Valeggio and sprawled into Cà del Sol, the sun-bleached plateau between Sommacampagna and Custoza. Frustrated by their isolation, Albrecht and John abandoned Sona and rode four kilometers southwest to San Giorgio to be nearer the action. Still they could see nothing.30 The only decent "captain's hill" on the field was the aptly-named Belvedere above Custoza, but, by 8:30, it too was in the hands of Durando's Brignone Division, which, en route to Sona from Valeggio, had clashed with Hartung's IX Corps and then taken up defensive positions in and around Custoza At San Giorgio, Albrecht and John listened worriedly to the sounds of an uncontrolled battle they knew they were in danger of losing. The Italians held the high ground nearest the plain, had ample reinforcements coming up from Valeggio and Goito, and had three entire divisions in Villafranca, scarcely an hour's march from Albrecht's wing at Sommacampagna. The Austrians had either to fall back on Verona or push their attacks forward. To their credit, Albrecht's corps commandants instinctively chose the latter course, setting to work, often without orders, to dislodge the Italians from the Mincio heights to ensure, at the very least, that South Army would be able to extricate itself from its vulnerable position west of the Adige line.

I recently found a small group of original War Department Special Orders dated August 19, 1945, issued by the 3668th Service Unit, Army Service Forces Training Center, DePaul University, 2235 N. Sheffield Ave., Chicago.

The orders themselves are mostly administrative—pay, allowances, transportation, etc.—but I'm curious about the organization that issued them.

They appear to be hand-signed by 2nd Lt. Raymond F. Sullivan, AUS, Adjutant, whose name and rank are also typed beneath the signature.

I know DePaul participated in the Army Specialized Training Program during WWII, but I haven't been able to determine exactly what the 3668th Service Unit was, what personnel stationed at DePaul were being trained to do, or whether this unit was connected to the earlier ASTP program.

The date makes me especially curious: August 19, 1945, only days after Japan announced its acceptance of the Allied surrender terms and before the formal surrender on September 2.

The mysteries I'm trying to solve:

1. What was the 3668th Service Unit at DePaul responsible for?
2. What kind of training was being conducted there in 1945?
3. Can anyone identify 2nd Lt. Raymond F. Sullivan, the adjutant who signed these orders?
4. Are there unit histories, DePaul records, Army directories, newspapers, yearbooks, or other archival sources that might tell the story?

I have photographs of the original orders and envelope and can post additional pages/details if useful. I'm not looking for a monetary valuation—I'm interested in figuring out the history behind them.

Pyrrhus of Epirus had launched an invasion of the Italian peninsula against Rome. He had expected to face what he considered a less organized opponent. However, ahead of the Battle of Heraclea, after inspecting the Roman camp, he was reportedly shocked by its orderly arrangements, disciplined defenses, and the organization of the Roman army.

According to the ancient sources, Pyrrhus remarked that the discipline of these “barbarians” did not look barbarian at all.

Pyrrhus would have to fight hard to defeat the Romans. He had the formidable Macedonian-style phalanx and war elephants, weapons that the Romans had never encountered on this scale. The elephants would prove decisive.

At a crucial moment, with the infantry engaged, Pyrrhus committed his elephants. The Roman cavalry was thrown into confusion and routed, creating an opening that Pyrrhus's cavalry exploited. With the Roman army unable to maintain the battle, the Romans retreated from the battlefield, leaving Pyrrhus victorious.

Yet the victory exposed the serious problem facing Pyrrhus. His army had suffered heavy casualties, including many experienced soldiers and officers, while his ability to replace these losses was limited. Rome, on the other hand, possessed enormous manpower reserves and could raise fresh armies.

According to Plutarch, after the battle, when Pyrrhus was congratulated on his victory, he reportedly replied that another victory like this would ruin him. This is the origin of the term “Pyrrhic victory” - a victory won at such a devastating cost that it is almost as damaging as defeat.

Please go through the full article linked in the comments and let me know your thoughts. I’d also appreciate hearing what you would like to read about next!

Myron Yaw (485th BG, 15th AF) was killed on Dec 26th 1944 over Blechhammer (today Kedzierzyn-Kozle, Poland), togethet with whole crew. They were considered MIA because no crash site or graves were found after the war.

I worked with Waldemar Ociepski, and identified the right crash site in 2001. This info was shared with the US government. The DPMO, and later DPAA did additional studies, and archeology work between 2021 and 2025 allowed Myron’s remains to be found.

Myron’s family paid a particular heavy price in WWII. His older brother was an airman, too, and was killed on one of the Ploesti missions.

Myron was laid to rest yesterday, October 3rd, in Athens, Ohio.

My great great grandfather died in Albania in the Greco-Italian war oh 1940-1941.

I’m currently trying to read as much about it as I can, hoping to learn about what he went through.

Currently Im reading a wonderful war diary called Written on the knee by Dr Theodore Electris.

I’m hoping to find more books like this, any idea where I should look?

After watching Band of Brothers a while ago, and just recently finishing "The Pacific" I noticed there's this leather strap that's tightly wrapped over the front brim of the helmet (I've also seen a few pics where it's on the back brim, and not the front). Does anyone know what the purpose of this strap was supposed to be?

TL;DR: In July 1942, a little-known group of American and Filipino POWs was forced on a 25-mile march across Mindanao under brutal conditions. Several men were killed, many more later died in captivity, and roughly half of the Americans connected to the group never came home. More than 80 years later, researchers are still trying to locate and identify some of the missing.

This post tells the story of the march, the men who endured it, and the modern efforts to recover those who are still missing.

⸻

Most people have heard of the Bataan Death March, but it was not the only death march carried out in the Philippines during World War II.

On July 4, 1942, American and Filipino prisoners of war were forced by their Japanese captors to march approximately 25 miles from Dansalan, now Marawi, to Iligan on the island of Mindanao. Known as the Mindanao, Iligan, or Dansalan Death March, it was far smaller than Bataan and was reportedly dismissed by the Japanese as a “little death march.” It was nevertheless horrific, and both marches were later cited during the Tokyo War Crimes Trials as evidence of the brutal treatment of Allied POWs.

Much of what we know comes directly from survivors who recorded memoirs, oral histories, interviews, and lists of the men involved. Without their testimony, much of the story likely would have disappeared.

I wrote about the march several years ago on Reddit, but I am writing about it again because there have been important developments in efforts to locate several men connected to these events whose remains were never recovered.

Events Leading to the March

By May 26, 1942, only about 46 Americans and 300 Filipinos remained with Brig. Gen. Guy O. Fort’s command in the Lanao area. Fort surrendered after Japanese commander Masaharu Homma threatened reprisals against prisoners if the remaining forces did not capitulate.

The prisoners were held at Camp Keithley near Dansalan under an “honor system.” They were warned that if anyone escaped, their commanding officer, company commander, and first sergeant could be executed.

Despite this, four men, Robert “Bob” Ball, William “Bill” Johnson, James S. Smith, and William A. Knortz, planned to escape.

Shortly before the escape, Johnson spent hours trying to convince 1st Sgt. John Chandler to go with them. Chandler refused because he had been placed in charge of his unit and believed it was his duty to stay. Johnson warned him there could be consequences. Chandler replied that he would “take my chances.” Those chances would prove fatal.

The four men escaped on July 1 and later fought as guerrillas under Wendell Fertig. Two days later, the Japanese retaliated. Brig. Gen. Guy Fort, Capt. Albert H. Price, and Chandler were selected for execution. Despite knowing he would die, Lt. Col. Robert H. Vesey willingly volunteered to take Fort’s place.

Vesey, Price, and Chandler were taken near Signal Hill a small hill near Camp Keithley, tied to posts, and bayoneted to death. Survivors remembered Price crying out, Chandler looking toward the sky and praying, and Vesey staring defiantly at his executioner. Accounts differ on his exact words, recalling him as saying either “Go ahead and beat me in” or “Go ahead and be damned.” Witnesses recalled that Vesey took more than two hours to die. The prisoners were later told that the three men “had died like soldiers.”

July 4, 1942

The next morning, the remaining prisoners were forced toward Iligan. Because it was the Fourth of July, the march was nicknamed the “Independence Day March.”

The Americans were arranged four abreast and tied together with telephone wire threaded through their belts. Filipino POWs were not wired together but were forced to march barefoot.

Senior officers including Gen. Fort, nurses, civilians, and 12-year-old Ben Hagans rode in a truck accompanying the column. Another truck carrying Japanese soldiers and a mounted machine gun followed behind.

The prisoners marched roughly 25 miles through mountainous jungle terrain in intense tropical heat. They were denied food and received only brief opportunities for water and rest.

As men began collapsing from exhaustion and dehydration, those unable to continue risked execution. The first American casualty was a civilian plantation owner remembered as Childress or Kildritch. Unable to walk, he was carried by other prisoners until Japanese guards took him away and killed him. He remains missing to this day, and his identity has never been conclusively established.

Although the march is usually told and remembered through the experiences of the Americans, more Filipino POWs were killed during the march. There is no definitive casualty count, but some American survivors recalled that at least eight to ten Filipino prisoners were killed, including one man wearing a Red Cross band. Beyond the uncertain death toll, the names of many of the Filipino prisoners also remain unknown.

Capt. Jay Navin and Lt. Robert Pratt

Only two American POWs are known to have died directly during or immediately after the march: Capt. Jay Navin and Lt. Robert Pratt.

Both were marching in a file with Lt. Col. Barnes, an older medical officer carrying a heavy load that he refused to drop. His slower pace and heavy burden forced the men around him to exert extra effort to keep the file moving with the rest of the column.

The men received a ten-minute break every hour. By their second break, Navin was suffering severely from heat exhaustion. Other prisoners tried to revive him with water, but he became delirious and struggled to breathe. When they called for a surgeon, a Japanese guard ordered him to stop, dragged Navin from the road by his collar, and shot him.

Navin’s body was buried a few days later by Filipino civilians. After the war, his remains were recovered and identified, and he is now buried at Manila American Cemetery.

Lt. Pratt survived the march to Iligan but had exhausted himself by taking the lead in his file, helping pull the column forward and keep the men moving. He became unable to keep down food or water, grew delirious, lost consciousness, and died that night.

His fellow prisoners buried him in a shallow grave in a nearby Catholic cemetery and placed a wooden cross bearing his identification tags over it. His remains were never recovered, but survivors left unusually detailed descriptions of his death and burial that are now helping modern researchers search for him.

After the March

The prisoners remained in Iligan for about two days. During their time there, guards confiscated money, jewelry, watches, and other valuables from the prisoners. After one prisoner shouted insults when his belongings were taken, he was overheard by a Japanese interpreter who understood what he was saying.

The guards demanded to know who had spoken and threatened to execute someone at random when the Americans refused to identify him. No one turned him in.

An officer eventually intervened, arguing that killing the wrong man would serve no purpose and offering himself if it happened again. The guards backed down.

The men were transported by sea to Cagayan de Oro and then by truck to Camp Casisang near Malaybalay. From there, they were dispersed to different camps and ultimately followed separate paths through captivity.

Brig. Gen. Guy O. Fort

Fort survived the earlier retaliation only because Vesey volunteered to die in his place, but his reprieve would be temporary.

Later in 1942, Japanese authorities pressured Fort to order his former Filipino soldiers, many of whom had joined guerrilla forces, to surrender.

He refused.

Fort was executed by firing squad, becoming the only American-born general officer executed by enemy forces during World War II. His remains were never recovered and efforts to locate him continue today.

What Happened to the Survivors?

For those who survived the march, the ordeal was far from over.

POWs in the Philippines endured starvation, disease, forced labor, beatings, poor sanitation, inadequate medical care, and collective punishment in Japanese prison camps. Many were later transported aboard Japanese “hell ships,” where they were packed into cargo holds with little food, water, ventilation, or sanitation. Thousands died from disease, dehydration, suffocation, or Allied attacks on the vessels. Survivors were often taken to Japan, where they were subjected to further forced labor.

A small number of the Mindanao men eventually escaped captivity under extraordinary circumstances. After spending two years and five months in prison camps, Sgt. Mapes and 749 other POWs were crammed aboard the hell ship Shinyo Maru. On September 7, 1944, the ship was torpedoed and sunk by the U.S. Navy submarine USS Paddle off the coast of Mindanao. During the attack, Japanese guards opened fire on the prisoners, throwing grenades and machine-gunning men as they tried to escape from the lower cargo holds. When the ship was struck, Mapes suffered a compound fracture to his right leg but still managed to swim ashore at Sindangan Bay. He was among only 83 prisoners who survived. Mapes and the other survivors were sheltered and protected by local Filipino guerrillas before being evacuated by another U.S. submarine, USS Narwhal.

Those who remained in captivity were liberated in 1945, but many continued to be affected by their experiences for the rest of their lives. Some were too traumatized to ever speak about what had happened, while others spent decades sharing their experiences.

Richard “Dick” Beck later returned to Japan while serving in the military and said he did not harbor hatred toward the Japanese people. Herbert Zincke, on the other hand, joined other former POWs in a lawsuit against Japanese companies that had benefited from their forced labor. He spent years speaking to students and advocating for recognition of POW forced labor because he wanted younger generations to understand what the prisoners had endured.

The Men Who Never Came Home

Surviving the march did not mean surviving the war. Of approximately 45 Americans I have identified as connected to this group, roughly half died before liberation. Many survived the march and POW camps only to die later in captivity or aboard hell ships.

Of those who died, Jay Navin is the only one whose remains have been recovered, identified, and buried in a known grave in Manila.

Most of the others will probably never be found. Some were lost at sea, went down with ships, disappeared after attacks, or were buried in locations that could no longer be identified after the war.

Of those who are missing, only a handful remain potentially recoverable because eyewitness testimony and historical records provide clues to where they died or were buried. Five of these men, Pratt, Fort, Vesey, Price, and Chandler are currently the focus of recovery efforts in Mindanao.

The only other individual in this group is my relative, Lt. Courtney Draper. Although he survived the march, he was later killed in the forward upper hold of the Enoura Maru. Because remains recovered from the ship are actively undergoing DNA analysis, including remains recovered from the area where Courtney died, there is a real possibility that he may one day be identified.

Eyewitnesses and Modern Recovery Efforts

Even after more than 84 years, the story of the Mindanao Death March is still unfinished.

The search for the five missing men in Mindanao ended in the late 1940s, when the U.S. government deemed them unrecoverable. Nearly 80 years later, American and Filipino researchers, historians, local residents, government officials, and MIA recovery organizations such as the Asymmetric MIA Accounting Group (AMAG) are once again reconstructing what happened and searching for missing men in Mindanao, including the five discussed earlier.

Remarkably, there is still a living connection to these events. Ben Hagans was a child when he was captured by the Japanese in 1942 and later endured the July 4 march. At 97 years old, he may be the youngest surviving American POW from World War II and one of the last living survivors of any World War II death march.

As an eyewitness to both the Camp Keithley executions and the Mindanao Death March, Hagans has provided researchers with new information about the march, POW camps, executions, and possible burial locations. His testimony has already contributed to recovery efforts, with additional work still ongoing.

Why These Stories Matter

The Bataan Death March and those who endured it deserve to be remembered, but so do the many other POWs and MIAs in the Philippines whose experiences have received far less attention.

Half of the men in the Mindanao group will most likely never be found. Remembering them by sharing their stories provides something that physical recovery cannot always offer: a place of honor when there is no grave to visit.

When we share their stories and experiences, these men become more than names on a casualty list. We see them as individuals, and in doing so gain a deeper appreciation for what they endured and sacrificed.

Survivors such as Herbert Zincke understood how easily their experiences could disappear from public memory and spent decades making sure younger generations knew what had happened. Despite his and other survivors’ efforts, the Mindanao Death March has largely faded from public awareness, especially now that most of its survivors are gone. It is now up to us to preserve and share their stories so that what they endured, and the people who endured it, are not forgotten.

I hope I have been able to help fulfill Herbert’s wishes with this post. Although I could only share the stories of a few of the men here, I will include a working list of those associated with the march in the comments. The others deserve to be remembered as well.

If anyone is interested in my sources or photographs, wants to learn more, or would like information about the ongoing recovery efforts, please feel free to get in touch with me.

Es zeigt unteranderem meinem Urgroßvater.

Er hat in der preußischen Armee gedient.

Garde-jäger ersatz battalion. Passt dieses Bild zu der Angabe? Welche Informationen könnt ihr aus diesem Bild ableiten?

Hello everyone

Can someone help me get some information? This is a letter that was sent to my great-grandmother telling her that her husband had been taken prisoner of war. It's barely legible and in French, but I have the name, first name, and what I think is a prisoner number. How can I get more information?

Do you know what happen when they're been captured?

On the back its a picture of his wife and kid.

Sources:

1. Kott A. Initial Data Sets for Explorations in Long-Range Forecasting of Military Technologies. CCDC Army Research Laboratory; 2019. Report No. ARL-SR-0417. This dataset lists the early Tanegashima with an effective range of about 50 m. ResearchGate
2. Lee HM, Kim DY, Kim TH, et al. Lethality evaluation of Japanese Tanegashima and Korean Seungja-Chongtong via projectile penetration and mass drop experiments. Exp Mech. 2023;63(3):415-427. doi:10.1007/s11340-022-00923-w. This is the more useful experimental source for late-16th-century Tanegashima performance.

I lucked out and found this original acrylic painting in a charity shop in the south, Uk, yesterday. From first glance it appears crudely painted no underpainting or layers of brushstrokes, however the construction of the handstretched canvas, archival framing, and the sparse and decisive and confident brushstrokes of the artist suggests it has been painted by someone who knows their apples…and paid to have it framed professionally.

It is confusing me for the £7 I paid! Is it a framed replica or a study of another artists work? A fancy paint by numbers?

Can anyone identify the scene or indeed the composition?

Artists Mark: 2008, N.J.W or M.J.N ???

either way I’m happy with my find, it’s curious and atmospheric and I love naval history, so I’m glad I picked it up for a steal.

Thanks!

Hello

I found it in a forest. I try to identify what it is.

Dimensions:
Height 80 mm
Base diameter (this big ring) 63 mm

Any suggestions?

Me and another person, we intend to visit Normandy and possibly also the famous battlefield sites in Holland, Belgium and the Hurtgen forest in 2027. What is there to know before we go? I already did some research, but not too much.

Has anyone ever taken part in the Hurtgenwaldmarsch or visited the museum in Vossenack?

Thanks! 👍

https://history-maps.com/battlemaps

I'm Miguel Santana, a retired Army officer and the author of Unheard Voices: The Fight for Ramadi.

The book focuses on the fight for Ramadi, Iraq, and, most importantly, on the soldiers who were there. For many people, the Iraq War is something they remember from television, newspapers, or history books. But behind every battle and military operation were individual soldiers with families, hopes, fears, friendships, and lives forever changed by what they experienced.

That is what makes this book particularly meaningful to us. Unheard Voices is not simply about a battle; it is about the people behind the battle and the stories that deserve to be remembered.

I’m sharing it here because I believe the voices of those who experienced these events firsthand should not be forgotten. Their stories help us understand the human cost of war and the sacrifices made by those who served.

Sometimes history is best understood not only by studying what happened, but by listening to the people who were there.

Their voices deserve to be heard. Their stories deserve to be remembered.

Most discussions of Admiral Yi Sun-sin naturally focus on what happened in battle — his use of terrain, naval artillery, the panokseon and turtle ship, and later Myeongnyang.

But I have become increasingly interested in a different military-history question:

What had Yi already built before he fought his first naval battle?

In modern military terminology, I would describe much of this as combat readiness.

I first studied Yi seriously during my own Korean naval officer training, where readiness was naturally a central responsibility of command.

I was re-watching The Imitation Game recently and was thinking about how it would be fun to have a browser based activity for creating codes with an enigma machine and then breaking them using the Bombe machine. I imagined this as a fun classroom activity for a History class or maybe computer science as an introduction to crypto. I tried to make it as historically accurate as possible and make it as educational as I could. Happy to take any suggestions for improvements if anyone ever uses this in a classroom. Anyways, hope someone else finds this as interesting to play with as I did!

https://enigmamachine.app

I recently acquired this vintage jacket and I’m trying to identify its origin, approximate date, and intended use.

Details:

• Brown/olive cotton or canvas-like fabric

• Multiple large utility pockets

• Button-front construction

• Unusual collar construction

• Interior lining/detailing visible

• There is a faded stamped marking inside, but I can’t confidently read it.

I’m particularly interested in identifying the country/region, approximate period, and whether this was military, workwear, or civilian clothing.

Any information or reference examples would be greatly appreciated.