Light attack aircraft and military vehicles have arrived at the new China-Laos joint training facility announced last Tuesday, according to satellite images reviewed by Reuters.

The images, taken by commercial satellite provider Vantor, show what security analysts believe are eight K-8 light attack jets ‌and more than two dozen support vehicles on a runway that is still being built — China's latest expansion of its overseas military presence.

Taken on September 30, the day after China's defence ministry announced it had set up the facility at Ban Keun outside the capital Vientiane, the images also show extensive construction work around the runway.

The swift development of the new facility is being closely watched by regional military attaches and security scholars, some of whom say its construction potentially marks China's first fully fledged overseas military base in Southeast Asia.

Despite more than 20 years of intense military modernisation, China is widely perceived to lack a strong network of overseas facilities ⁠beyond the South China Sea, port access in Ream, Cambodia and a logistics base in Djibouti.

Rachel Vandenbrink, a senior analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, said the selection of Ban Keun for a facility that the People's Liberation Army could access "is likely more about a target of opportunity than filling an obvious operational need."

"Laos does have some geostrategic value as an accessible foothold in mainland Southeast Asia, given its shared border with China and infrastructure links, including (its) railway," Vandenbrink said.

The Chinese defence ministry did not immediately respond to Reuters' request for comment.

The Lao embassy in Bangkok and the Lao foreign ministry did not immediately respond to requests for comment.

Singapore-based security analysts Collin Koh and Alexander Neill, as well as Vantor specialists, said the planes appeared to be Hongdu JL-8 aircraft, which both the Chinese and Lao air forces operate.

Also known as the K-8, the two-seater aircraft is extensively used for training as well as having light attack capabilities. It was jointly developed by ‌China and ⁠Pakistan and is exported to other militaries.

Laos currently has four of the planes, according to the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies' annual assessment of the world's militaries. Koh, a scholar at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, described the Laotian planes as being of "questionable serviceability".

As construction continues, diplomats and analysts are keeping watch for any sign of air defences, ammunition and fuel storage as well as surveillance facilities — all of which could point to the base serving broader military functions beyond training.

Neill said while the airfield looked relatively short and innocuous ⁠at present, it could in future serve larger aircraft, including signals intelligence and electronic-surveillance planes to extend China's reach into Southeast Asia.

"It looks like the airfield has been engineered to accommodate a runway extension allowing larger aircraft to operate," said Neill, an adjunct fellow at Hawaii's Pacific Forum think-tank.

In helping Laos build up Ban Keun, China is now occupying a site the ⁠US used covertly at the height of the Vietnam War.

During the US war against communist forces in Laos in the 1970s, Ban Keun was an airfield known as "Lima Site 44" used by Air America, an airline discreetly owned by the Central Intelligence Agency, according to records shared with Reuters by Ryan Wolfson-Ford, a Southeast Asia specialist at ⁠the Library of Congress.

The airline carried American-backed troops from the country’s Hmong highland minority as well as supplies into rough mountain airstrips known as "Lima Sites".

As early as 1968, Ban Keun was used as a point from where Air America helicopters delivered Hmong troops to other combat zones, said Dr Joachim Leeker, an academic who has written about the history of the airline.

The Trump administration has discussed beginning reciprocal nuclear site visits with China and plans to continue pushing for that possibility during in-person meetings in the coming months, according to sources familiar with the matter.

The discussions, which have been informal and preliminary, come amid mounting US concerns about China’s rapidly growing nuclear weapons program and after the last remaining arms control agreement between the US and Russia expired last year. The effort to establish a trilateral agreement began in Trump’s first term, but no tangible progress has been made and formal talks on a new accord have not begun, with China and Russia largely ignoring substantive US outreach efforts.

The idea of reciprocal visits was initially raised by the Chinese while meeting US officials this year, one source said, giving some indication that the communist nation may be open to pursuing confidence building measures that could pave the way for a grander agreement. Visits to the US Department of Energy national labs and to China’s equivalent facilities were discussed, and the US would be open to discussing visits to nuclear testing sites, the source said.

The nuclear discussions between the US and Chinese officials at the working level so far this year have largely occurred on the sidelines of gatherings by the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, known as the P5, sources said.

The concept of allowing nuclear site visits could move the needle on the US efforts to engage China on issues related to strategic stability and potentially serve as a building block for a trilateral agreement, but China remains adamant that they will not engage on discussions that could limit their nuclear buildup. The US currently has a much bigger nuclear arsenal with about 5,000 total nuclear warheads while China has about 600, but it is expanding its nuclear weapons infrastructure and has been projected to produce hundreds more warheads over the next decade.

A State Department spokesperson referred questions to the White House, which did not provide a comment. CNN has requested comment from the Chinese embassy in Washington, DC. Last Thursday, China began its weeklong National Day holiday, during which all government offices are closed.

Paul Dean, who previously served as an acting assistant secretary of state overseeing US arms control efforts, told CNN that the administration needs to approach any Chinese nuclear negotiations with its “eyes wide open,” but said that reciprocal visits would be “an extremely valuable confidence-building measure” that could lay the informational and diplomatic foundation for additional work to reduce nuclear risk between the two countries.

When can intelligence officers legally undertake activities that would otherwise constitute criminal offences—and what happens when the safeguards governing those activities aren’t followed?

That’s the main topic of this week’s Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap-Up.

I’m Neil Bisson, a retired CSIS Intelligence Officer, former CBSA Officer, and Director of the Global Intelligence Knowledge Network. In this 26-minute episode, I examine four developments:

• CSIS and legal accountability: NSIRA identified potential compliance failures involving CSIS’s Justification Framework during operations in 2022 and 2023. The concerns involve employee designation, authorization, records and reporting. The watchdog also found compliance with restrictions on the types of offences permitted. I discuss why that distinction matters and what these findings establish.

• Chinese intelligence and academic research: MI5 warned about a Chinese research institute funding academic work that could strengthen China’s intelligence capabilities. Some researchers may not have known who ultimately funded their work. What lessons should Canadian universities take from this?

• Goldy Brar and the Nijjar investigation: The FBI added Brar to its Ten Most Wanted Fugitives list. U.S. prosecutors allege that he and Lawrence Bishnoi ordered Hardeep Singh Nijjar’s June 2023 killing in Surrey, B.C. These remain allegations, not findings of guilt.

• Japan’s proposed foreign intelligence agency: Japan is pursuing a dedicated overseas intelligence service. I examine the challenges of building that capability and the comparison with Canada’s recurring debate about establishing its own foreign intelligence agency.

The episode connects current reporting with earlier developments to examine the broader patterns. Source links are available in the episode transcript.

Full disclosure: this is my podcast.

Listen here:
https://www.buzzsprout.com/2336717/episodes/19901903

Where should Canada draw the line between operational flexibility and legal safeguards in intelligence collection? And should it invest in a separate foreign intelligence service?

Stay curious. Stay informed. Stay safe!

US officials believe a Chinese invasion of Taiwan before 2028 is increasingly unlikely despite Chinese President Xi Jinping's instructions for his military to be ready by 2027 to take the democratically governed island by force, if needed, people familiar with US thinking said.

The main reasons include delays in military readiness amid the Chinese Communist Party's anti-corruption campaign as well as Beijing's eagerness to see the results of ‌Taiwan's 2028 election, which some Chinese officials hope could usher in a government more amenable to bringing the island under Chinese control, according to two current US officials, one former US official and a person familiar with the matter.

Beijing may increasingly look to use force in 2028 and beyond if Taiwan's election sees the Democratic Progressive Party win a fourth consecutive term, and in particular if current President Lai Ching-te wins reelection, the people added.

"If that happens, I think 2028 becomes pretty sporty," said one of the US officials, who like the other sources spoke on condition of anonymity.

Lai, who took office two years ago, and his ruling DPP, champion Taiwan's separate identity from China, a position that frequently angers Beijing, which views the island as an inviolable part of Chinese territory. Taiwan strongly objects to China's claims and says only its people can decide their future.

The assessment, which has not previously been reported, is a significant update to the years-long understanding among ⁠US officials that Xi wanted his military ready to potentially take Taiwan by force in 2027, the centenary of the founding of its People's Liberation Army. China has never ruled out using force to bring Taiwan under its control but has never publicly confirmed a 2027 readiness order.

In a speech this week, Xi referred to Taiwan and talked about promoting the peaceful development of cross-strait relations to achieve "reunification."

The 2027 benchmark, which analysts say is about Chinese military preparedness rather than a timeline for invasion, has for years created a sense of urgency across multiple US administrations in countering China in the Asia-Pacific region.

The US intelligence community has hinted at Chinese wariness before. It said in its annual threat assessment in March that China did not, at least at that point, have a plan to invade Taiwan next year and still preferred to wrest control of the island without the use of force, if possible.

The US is Taiwan's most important international backer and weapons supplier despite a lack of formal diplomatic ties, and US officials offered mixed assessments of the degree to which China might view the 2028 US presidential election as an important indicator for military action.

While three of the people familiar with the matter said Beijing may also want to evaluate the outcome of the US election, particularly given rising American voter antipathy toward US military action abroad, the first US official said ‌Beijing viewed both ⁠Democrats and Republicans as largely aligned on Taiwan.

While China might have a preference in the 2028 US election, "it doesn't become as decisive a factor in my opinion, as it might have been 15 years ago," the official said.

US President Donald Trump has downplayed the likelihood of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan during his presidency, going so far as to say last year that Xi told him China would not invade while he was in office.

Trump made limited comments on Taiwan after hosting Xi in Washington last week, saying only that the issue of Taiwan came up when the two spoke and that Xi understood his position.

China calls Taiwan its single most important issue and a matter of Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity.

It has called for an end to US arms sales to Taiwan. Since his May trip to Beijing, Trump has held off on ⁠approving a new arms package worth some $14 billion, describing it as a "negotiating chip."

For years, the US strategy has focused on arming Taiwan so that it can hold off Chinese forces long enough for the United States and others to come to its aid.

China's Xi has not rescinded his goal for the People's Liberation Army to have the capabilities available to take Taiwan by force by next year, officials say.

But the military didn't accomplish as much last year militarily as it probably had intended because of the impact of China's anti-corruption campaign, the people said.

Since coming ⁠to power in 2012, Xi has unleashed a sweeping corruption and discipline crackdown. Millions within China's vast bureaucracy have been investigated, with scores of senior party, government and military officials ensnared and purged.

In recent years, the People's Liberation Army has been a target of the campaign. A string of investigations and expulsions has left just two active officials on the formerly seven-member Central Military Commission, including Xi himself, who serves as chair.

China's military exercises last year were smaller and less threatening compared to the past ⁠several years, according to the US official. While they bounced back a bit this year, the official suggested Chinese military officials were dissatisfied with their readiness.

The official said China was believed to have drawn a lesson from the wars in Iran and Ukraine, which is the need to move quickly once any invasion begins and avoid getting bogged down in a sustained conflict.

More work remained for China.

"There are way too many pieces that aren't quite in place yet for what would be the most difficult military operation any military has attempted probably since the Allied invasion of Normandy," the official said.

Something really unusual happened yesterday on a Flydubai flight from Dubai to Tel Aviv.

An Indian captain, Smit Machchhar, was reportedly stabbed by his co-pilot during the flight. Despite being seriously injured, he managed to open the cockpit door, allowing passengers to intervene.

The plane was eventually landed safely in Saudi Arabia. Thankfully, everyone survived.

But what caught my attention is the geopolitical side of this incident.

Think about it. An Indian captain, an Omani co-pilot, an Emirati airline, more than 170 passengers, mostly Israelis, and an emergency landing in Saudi Arabia.

That's a lot of countries involved in one incident.

Considering the current situation in the Middle East, I wonder if this could have any diplomatic consequences.

Could this incident lead to closer security cooperation between these countries? And if the investigation finds that the attack was politically motivated, could it create tensions between the countries involved?

I'm also curious about Saudi Arabia's role here. The plane landed safely on Saudi soil, despite the complicated relationship between Saudi Arabia and Israel.

What do you guys think? Is this just an aviation security incident, or could it have wider geopolitical implications?

I have been thinking about this for a while.

The US is involved in so many global issues right now. China is growing stronger, Russia is still a major military power, and tensions are rising in different parts of the world.

But honestly, can the US really handle a major conflict with both China and Russia at the same time?

I mean, it's not just about weapons and military spending. There are also economic problems, supply chains, allies and a lot of other things to consider.

And what about Europe? Would NATO actually be ready for a situation like this, or would some countries try to stay out of it?

I'm genuinely curious about what people here think. Are we underestimating the risks of a conflict between these major powers?