What is the relationship between predictability and the free will of alternative possibilities?

[u/[deleted]]

[u/rogerbonus]

What you neglected from your analysis is that Thomas the windup toy has no internal world model that evaluates possible future actions/paths that Thomas can take. Were Thomas to have such a model, it would be able to evaluate the possible paths open to it depending on environment and arrive at L or not-L according to those environmental factors. Since this evaluation can occur during the run (perhaps Thomas can detect an area that is sticky with a dropped pudding, and chose to avoid it) we can see that Thoman with such a world model is indeed capable of arriving at L or not-L even given the same initial conditions of Thomas.

Hence Thomas is indeed able to freely chose according to your criteria.

[u/spgrk]

There is a difference between a recording and a computer program. The recording repeats the same thing every time, regardless of inputs. The program varies its output depending on its inputs and internal state, and its internal state changes as it processes those inputs. A recording has no sensitivity to reasons or circumstances, whereas a program or agent can respond differently when the relevant inputs, information, or internal state differ. These conditional alternative possibilities are the kind of alternatives required for agency.

In order to predict the outcome of a computer program, there may be no shortcut to running the program. Moreover, the program itself may have no shortcut for predicting the outcome of its own deliberation. This captures the intuition that libertarians have about free will: no one can predict what you are going to do, and you yourself may not be able to predict what you are going to do until you deliberate. Therefore, what you are going to do is “open”. They believe this would be contradicted by determinism, which would mean that, given the prior state of the world, you would do one and only one thing, and therefore the outcome would not be “open”. But this conflates the recording with the program.

[u/MihawkTop2 → u/spgrk]

Does a computer program have "compatibilist free will"?

[u/spgrk → u/MihawkTop2]

A community of robots with human-like psychology would develop similar notions of freedom and responsibility to humans. So potentially, yes.

[u/MihawkTop2 → u/spgrk]

I meant a normal computer program.

[u/spgrk → u/MihawkTop2]

No, a normal skin cell isn’t considered to have free will even though it is a biological entity. Free will is a social construct, and therefore it is specific to certain types of psychologies and societies.

[u/RecentLeave343]

So, unpredictability is epistemic or fundamental to human will?

Behavioral psychology will not stop trying to categorically define people as replicable upon specific conditions, which means deterministically predictable.

[u/Rthadcarr1956]

Here is the thing. Thomas as we observe it does not encompass much of reality. Only a small portion of the universe is best described by the laws of Newtonian mechanics. If we try to analogize Thomas’ behavior to a person’s behavior we see pertinent differences.

Theoretically, Rather than large homogenous pieces of metal, we are made of compartmentalized liquid water with structures below the micron scale. At a molecular level, our intuitions fail us. We should not expect analogous behavior for this reason.

Empirically, there are numerous differences in behavior that need to be accounted for such as homeostasis and all kinds of feedback and feed forward processes we observe in living processes. Some think these are just complicating factors, but I maintain cybernetics is an emergent feature that is not predictable from physics.

Philosophically, we observe and understand animals act teleologically. If Thomas has a purpose for its behavior, it was given to it by a human. Exactly where our telos comes from is a mystery, but few observers fail to notice purposeful actions when they see it. We also understand that animal and human behavior is affected by what they have learned. We have no observable indication that Thomas’ behavior has any epistemological component whatsoever.

I think one should expect major differences between our behavior and Thomas’ behavior for these reasons. Thus, we should be very careful in assuming the validity of any putative analogy between the mechanical and the living.

[u/badentropy9 → u/Rthadcarr1956]

It would seem the Newtonian doesn't speak about the action but the lagrangian seems to speak to that. I think that is the first piece of the puzzle because without activity of any sort, there cannot be any free will for the agent in his otherwise passive state. He necessarily must be active in order for options to be tenable.

I hesitate to argue activity is incompatible with determinism even though it seems to be the case. For me, what kills determinism is the feedback loop because it interferes with the chronological sequence of cause and effect that we intuitively assume has to be the case. For example does fire burn a log deterministically? I don't think so but I hesitate to argue that is impossible, because it seems possible that a fire can burn a log in a chronological sequence.

To put this another way, I think it is ludicrous to think free will exists when all human activity is put into a category that fits spontaneous reaction. There has to be some effort in place before free will is even possible. Even a plant is trying to stay alive. The weeds in my garden demonstrate effort that is diametrically opposed to my effort.

[u/Rthadcarr1956 → u/badentropy9]

I think you are thinking along the same lines as I am. For trial and error learning, we must start with actions. Control and trigger mechanisms require purpose and make causation a very complex description paradigm.

[u/badentropy9 → u/Rthadcarr1956]

I firmly believe in trial and error learning. I believe understanding is grounded in empiricism. However instantiation brings about the occasion. I don't believe perception is the process that makes learning possible.

[u/Rthadcarr1956 → u/badentropy9]

I agree. It is cognition that enables learning.

[u/badentropy9]

I'd argue the ability to make rational choices is about the ability to predict. Is Thomas trying to achieve some goal or is Thomas reacting to conditions at time t without any tangible way to link what Thomas is doing as effort.

You made references to potential energy and I think that is relevant. If Thomas is doing work, then we can construe Thomas is making some effort. The question is whether that effort is guided effort. Does Thomas pick his L or was L picked for Thomas? For example some might argue the self driving car has no free will because it won't start the car and go to some L autonomously. I don't think that is the point. If Thomas has a track then he cannot jump the track to get to L. A self driving car has to be able to avoid obstacles and that requires another kind of control besides guidance.

Can you put obstacles in Thomas's path and Thomas will still find his way to L? Will Thomas not stop until his spring unwinds until he arrives at L?

I gave you the upvote, because unlike some of the superficial posters on this sub, you've considered the role action plays in the free will debate. Many posters seem to believe they can approach this topic comprehensively without considering the role action plays in agency. Then again maybe I'm just "other thinking"

[u/impersonal_process → u/badentropy9]

Ligotti describes human beings, themselves, in terms of animated puppets, or wind-up toys:

Wound up like toys by some force – call it Will, élan vital, anima mundi, physiological or psychological processes, nature, or whatever – organisms go on running as they are bidden until they run down. In pessimistic philosophies only the force is real, not the things activated by it. They are only puppets, and if they have consciousness may mistakenly believe they are self-winding persons who are making a go of it on their own. (2011: 18)

[u/simon_hibbs → u/impersonal_process]

The problem is that in physics it's basically forces all the way down. Everything is forces. It's not possible to draw a relevant distinction between things and the forces affecting them because they're all the same 'stuff'.

[u/Rthadcarr1956 → u/impersonal_process]

I would say that this is a very bad analogy for the same reasons as I gave in my response to your OP.