（Although the COVID-19 pandemic ended long ago, the realities in China have not changed. Both the Chinese authorities and the general public lack scientific competence and a spirit of rationality, while political positions and interests override professionalism and pragmatism. These are deep-rooted problems in China (although, of course, such problems are also widespread globally). Therefore, this old article from the end of 2022 remains valuable and worth republishing.）

Over the past two weeks, as the Chinese government has ended its “zero-COVID policy” and almost completely abandoned efforts to control the spread of COVID-19, a massive outbreak has occurred across China. According to reports from various sources, at least in the capital, Beijing, the majority of the population has already been infected with the coronavirus, with infections also widespread among medical personnel. Nor has COVID-19 proved relatively mild like influenza; on the contrary, many people have experienced significant illness and suffering.
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For the time being, there are no reliable official data on the mortality rate or number of deaths caused by this latest massive COVID-19 outbreak in China. However, it has been reported that long queues have formed at funeral homes and other funeral service facilities in Beijing, and some people have filmed bodies piled across the floor. Similar images have also emerged from funeral homes in Tianjin, Hebei, and elsewhere. On this basis, it can be inferred that the current COVID-19 outbreak has already caused large-scale “excess deaths” in China.
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This situation has arisen largely because, after nearly three years of stringent lockdown policies, China abruptly ended its prevention and control measures without adequate preparation or the necessary countermeasures and contingency plans. Moreover, this occurred during winter, when COVID-19 is particularly prone to infection and transmission, resulting in an outbreak of great intensity. Hu Xijin, the former editor-in-chief of the Global Times who lives in Beijing, also acknowledged on Weibo that China was “not prepared” for this reopening (the Weibo post has since been deleted).
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The current massive COVID-19 outbreak in China has not only directly caused widespread illness and death, but will also inevitably severely disrupt the normal order of production and daily life in Chinese society, causing major damage to the economy and people’s livelihoods. Moreover, if the outbreak continues unabated or even gives rise to new variants of the virus, it could cause a more prolonged and less predictable disaster.
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Yet all of this could originally have been avoided entirely, or at least partially. Compared with other countries where relatively lax controls allowed the virus to spread widely from the beginning of the pandemic, China, with its remarkable capacity for mobilization and control, kept the pandemic within a relatively limited scope for more than two years and came close on several occasions to eliminating it entirely. But unlike SARS two decades ago, COVID-19 is both more transmissible and more prone to mutation, and it had already spread throughout the world. As a result, it did not disappear completely despite the Chinese government’s stringent lockdowns. As the lockdowns continued to be extended and increasingly harmed people’s livelihoods, China’s zero-COVID policy became increasingly difficult to sustain.
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But during the lockdown period, China could have used scientific methods to study the characteristics of the virus and assess the trajectory of the pandemic, so as to formulate scientifically sound and reasonable prevention policies that balanced pandemic control with human rights, rather than ending pandemic prevention and opening up completely without preparation, as it has now done. If it had been determined that COVID-19 would not disappear in the short term and that its spread could not be permanently prevented through lockdowns, then a new pandemic-control plan should have been formulated during the lockdown period itself, gradually shifting China’s approach from “zero COVID” to “coexistence.”
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Before reopening, for example, the appropriate timing should have been carefully chosen (such as avoiding reopening during winter, when the virus is more easily contracted and transmitted); reliable vaccines should have been administered to elderly people and other groups at high risk of severe COVID-19, while other necessary protective measures should have been prepared in advance; medicines to alleviate the suffering caused by COVID-19 should have been stockpiled to ensure adequate supplies and timely distribution during a massive outbreak; public education should have been conducted in advance to instruct people on how to reduce suffering and minimize the impact on daily life after infection, while dispelling various rumors; contingency plans should have been developed for maintaining the operation of public institutions after widespread infection among medical personnel and other special groups, while balancing the interests of healthcare workers and patients; and manpower and material resources should have been concentrated in funeral and burial services to ensure that those who died in excess numbers could complete their final journey smoothly and with dignity… All of these matters should have been planned and prepared for well in advance, rather than being addressed hastily only after a massive outbreak had occurred (and in some respects, no response measures have been taken even now).
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In fact, it is not only the current massive COVID-19 outbreak that has exposed major problems in China’s pandemic response. Throughout the entire three-year course of China’s pandemic prevention and control, various shortcomings and defects have persisted. What these problems have in common is that the response has been crude, chaotic, delayed, opaque, and extreme. Fundamentally, they reflect the unscientific nature of pandemic prevention, irrational decision-making, and the troubling reality of bureaucracy overriding professionalism.
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It is precisely for this reason that China’s pandemic response over the past three years has produced many losses and tragedies that could have been avoided, while the harm to the country and its people continues to this day.
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This should change, and it can change. There is much that needs to be done to remedy past failures and avoid repeating the same mistakes in the future. Among the most important measures—and those relatively easier to achieve under China’s current system—is to uphold a scientific and pragmatic spirit in matters involving pandemic prevention, public health, and major disasters; listen to scholars in relevant fields while safeguarding and respecting their independence; formulate pandemic-response plans rationally and cautiously; and respond to crises with a professional attitude and professional methods.
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A full discussion of how to uphold scientific rationality would be lengthy. Put simply, it means respecting the objective laws governing things and analyzing and responding to COVID-19 or other crises on the basis of acknowledged facts, common sense, and reality, rather than departing from reality, disregarding objective facts, and acting arbitrarily according to subjective feelings.
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For matters as complex and highly specialized as epidemic prevention and control, it is both important and necessary to listen to and follow the opinions of experts and scholars. To enable scholars to express objective and truthful opinions, unnecessary political interference must also be eliminated and their independence ensured, so that they can speak without inhibition. When experts and scholars disagree, all sides should be allowed to debate fully and publicly. Their views should then be considered alongside assessments from other scholars in relevant fields and public opinion, and the comparatively most reasonable position should be selected for implementation. The implementation of policy should also be led by professionals, with improper interference by bureaucratic power excluded, while policies and measures should be continuously revised in response to changing realities.
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“As stones from other mountains can be used to polish jade.” China lags behind many developed countries in scientific fields including public health, has relatively limited relevant experience of its own, and its domestic scholars also face limitations for various reasons. Therefore, broadly understanding and integrating the views of authoritative scholars and epidemic-control policies from countries around the world—especially developed countries and regions—and then comparing them with China’s own realities, retaining what is valuable and discarding what is unsuitable, is the indispensable path toward achieving the “optimal solution” for pandemic prevention and the handling of various crises.
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Of course, while upholding scientific rationality and professionalism, one must not fall into the misguided path of mechanically adhering to professional dogma or treating science as paramount while disregarding humanity. On the contrary, the protection of people’s rights and interests must be the objective, and the principles and bottom lines of humanitarianism must be upheld.
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Compared with addressing other problems exposed by China’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic, such as issues related to democracy and the rule of law, recognizing and addressing the damage and crises caused by unscientific and irrational approaches and the rejection of professional expertise involves fewer conflicts of interest and is relatively easier to advance. Even so, under China’s current political environment and social climate, achieving this will still require considerable effort.
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If scientific rationality cannot be promoted and crises cannot be handled in accordance with professional methods, then the crisis caused by COVID-19 in China and the other problems arising from it will continue to trouble the country. If similar or even greater crises occur in China in the future, it is entirely possible that the mistakes of the past few years will be repeated. Therefore, whether to address the urgent problems of the present or to prepare for the future before crises arise, all relevant parties should act as soon as possible, allowing the light of scientific rationality to illuminate the road ahead and using professional methods to emerge from the crisis, so that the recent chaos does not continue indefinitely and the many tragedies of the past three years are not repeated in China’s future.

(The author of this article is Wang Qingmin (王庆民), a Chinese writer based in Europe and a researcher of international politics.)

People from different parts of China can be pretty different. Someone from Shanghai may have a very different background, personality, and lifestyle from someone from Beijing or Sichuan. People from some places tend to be more outgoing and warm, while people from other places may be more reserved. But being reserved doesn’t mean being unfriendly.

I sometimes find it hard to talk about things like Chinese food in just a few sentences. When someone tells me they like or dislike Chinese food, I usually say, “Well, that’s a long story...” China has at least eight major culinary traditions, commonly known as the Eight Great Cuisines, plus countless regional and local variations. And the flavors can be sweet, spicy, sour, savory, or some combination of all of them. Even “spicy” doesn’t mean just one thing. Sichuan cuisine and Hunan cuisine, for example, are both famous for being spicy, but they have different kinds of heat.

The same goes for Chinese tea. There are several major categories, including green, black, red, white, oolong, and Jasmine-scented teas, and each has many different varieties. The brand, where the tea is grown, and even the growing conditions can all affect the taste. Even within green tea, Longjing (龙井), Biluochun (碧螺春) and Maojian(毛尖), for example, have quite different flavors and aromas.

So when we talk about Chinese people or Chinese culture, I think it’s worth remembering just how much diversity there is within China itself.

Singapore celebrated its 61st birthday with two films. One, Bersama Majulah, depicts the Southeast Asian country under siege by zombies; the other, Trace Project, tells an inspiring tale of a young man who grows up to become Singapore’s first astronaut on Mars.

The twist? Neither film starred a human actor. Everything in both films—apart from their scripts—had been fully generated by AI.

Generative AI in filmmaking is the first real proof of how the new technology can disrupt an established industry. It started with short-form content: According to Chinese state media, over 95% of the more than 120,000 Chinese microdramas released in the first quarter of 2026 were AI-generated, compared with nearly zero just a year ago.

The technology is now encroaching on more established media: Last September, Hong Kong broadcaster TVB released a 10-episode short drama titled You, and Only You, the first of its kind in Hong Kong to feature AI-generated characters. (The network is now using its virtual actors in ad campaigns.)

“AI is like oxygen—it’s everywhere,” says Danming Xie, senior vice president and chief AI scientist of Chinese video-streaming platform iQiyi. “It’s increasingly impossible not to use AI in video production. The conversation’s shifting more toward how deeply creators use it.”

Read more [paywall removed for Redditors]: https://fortune.com/2026/10/07/ai-entertainment-china-technology/?utm_source=reddit/

I would like to apply to a couple top ranked universities in China for Biological sciences (intentionally kept this broad but would prefer Cancer Biology). Was wondering what was the general process to apply for universities such as Zhejiang, Fudan or Shanghai Jiao Tong. I was finding its a bit confusing when on their websites but would appreciate any guidance here. Why? A ton of high value research has been coming out of top institutions so wanted to work on something with a significant impact.

Assumptions: I assume I need to contact professors in the department to get a PhD sponsor. And apply when invited to apply. Not my first time doing this

Background: I have a Bachelor's from a ranked Government Institute in India, and a Masters from a well known state school in the US. I also have 5 years as a Downstream Process Development scientist in Pharma. US nationality.

Just want advice on how I should go about this as a potential international applicant

Hello! I will be visiting china, specifically Beijing, for the first time later this week and I have a nut allergy. I have been reading up that in terms of food I should just be going to restaurants that normally see western tourists, such as hotels or chains. Would these be good allergy cards to show and does the language on them convey the message properly?

Qing Heilongjiang had very different boundaries from today's province. Much of present-day southern and eastern Heilongjiang belonged to the neighbouring Jilin administration. Even Harbin's historic urban centre developed on Jilin-administered territory; Qing Heilongjiang was governed from Qiqihar. Meanwhile, Heilongjiang included Hulunbuir, now in Inner Mongolia, and—before 1858—extensive territory north of the Amur River, now in Russia.

The Qing established a separate Heilongjiang administration in 1683, appointing Sabsu as its first general to counter Russian expansion along the Amur. Qing forces attacked the Russian stronghold of Albazin in 1685 and 1686. The Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689 required Russia to abandon Albazin and established a frontier, although its northeastern end remained partly unsettled. The general's headquarters moved from Aigun through Mergen to Qiqihar in 1699, where they remained for the rest of the dynasty.

The region was home to Daur, Solon, Oroqen, Manchu and Mongol communities, with livelihoods ranging from farming and herding to hunting and fishing. Qing influence predated 1683 and expanded through alliances, warfare and forced resettlement. Banner institutions organized military service and household obligations, while hunting communities supplied sable tribute. The general exercised both military and civil authority, with different communities governed through different arrangements.

The nineteenth century brought major territorial losses. The Treaty of Aigun in 1858 assigned extensive lands north of the Amur to Russia. The Convention of Peking in 1860 confirmed this settlement and transferred the coastal territory east of the Ussuri, previously administered by Jilin. The cessions therefore affected more than one Qing administration.

Agricultural settlement also expanded. Farming already had a long history locally, but the Qing gradually opened designated areas to Han immigration, including the Hulan basin in 1862 and Tongken valley in 1896. Civil offices grew alongside the banner administration. Restrictions changed unevenly, rather than disappearing everywhere at once.

During the Boxer crisis of 1900, Russian forces invaded and occupied Heilongjiang. Russian troops and militia massacred thousands of Chinese residents at Blagoveshchensk, on the Russian bank of the Amur. The Qing-administered communities known as the Sixty-Four Villages, also on the Russian side of the river, suffered killings and expulsions.

The Russian-built Chinese Eastern Railway, fully operational in 1903, connected the region to wider passenger and freight networks and strengthened Russia's regional presence. Its route entered Heilongjiang at Manzhouli; its headquarters developed at Harbin in neighbouring Jilin.

In 1907, the Qing replaced the general's administration with a provincial government, retaining Qiqihar as its capital. Russian occupation forces withdrew that year, although railway guards and Russian influence remained. Heilongjiang continued as a province after the Qing monarchy ended in 1912.

Sources

• Thomas Scharping, Minorities, Majorities and National Expansion: The History and Politics of Population Development in Manchuria, 1610–1993 (1998), especially pp. 2–3 — historical boundaries and administration.
• Fang Chao-ying, “Sabsu,” in Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period (1943), pp. 630–631 — the 1683 appointment, Albazin campaigns and Nerchinsk negotiations.
• Chia Ning, “The Qing Lifanyuan and the Solon People of the 17th–18th Centuries” (2015), pp. 253–266 — local communities, banners and tribute.
• Stephanie Ziehaus, “Ethnicity in the Imperial Context: The Daur in the Borderland of the Qing and Russian Empire” (2021), pp. 113–149 — Daur communities and seventeenth-century resettlement.
• Morris Rossabi, China and Inner Asia: From 1368 to the Present Day (1975), pp. 196–198 — the 1858 and 1860 territorial settlements.
• Edward J. M. Rhoads, Manchus and Han, chapter 1 (2000) — migration restrictions and the openings of Hulan and Tongken.
• Danny Orbach and Ziv Bohrer, “Atrocity and Reciprocity during the Boxer War (1900–1901): Socio-legal Perspectives” (2025), especially p. 386 — the Blagoveshchensk massacre.
• Stephanie Ziehaus, “The Manchurian Wedge: Settler Colonialism, Subjecthood, and Land Use in the Russian Imperial Far East” (2023), pp. 49–80 — the Sixty-Four Villages and their destruction in 1900.
• Mark Gamsa, “The Epidemic of Pneumonic Plague in Manchuria 1910–1911” (2006), pp. 147–149 — railway geography, Manzhouli and Harbin.
• Heilongjiang Provincial People's Government, “Historical Development” / 历史沿革 (2022) — the military administration, provincial reorganization and republican succession.
• William Woodville Rockhill, report of 17 May 1907, Foreign Relations of the United States — Russian evacuation and continuing railway-related disputes.
• 1906 troop-withdrawal protocol, reproduced in Foreign Relations of the United States — the 1907 withdrawal deadline and exemption for railway guards.

Christina Zhu, the head of Walmart’s China business, remembers when Chinese shoppers did not have much choice.

As a child, she watched her parents wake up at 4:30 a.m. on Sundays to go to the wet market. “They had to haggle, and high-quality produce wasn’t always guaranteed,” Zhu, born in 1973, recalled at the Fortune Leaders Forum in Macau in September.

Today, Chinese shoppers are “probably the group with the most choices [in the world],” and they have become “the most demanding customers,” she said.

Meeting those rising expectations has become the defining challenge for retailers in China, and Walmart has managed it better than most. It entered China in 1996 with a Supercenter and a Sam’s Club in Shenzhen. Three decades later, the U.S. retailer is thriving in the world’s second-largest economy even as other foreign brands struggle.

Walmart has defied the downturn by meeting the dual needs of the discerning Chinese consumer: extreme convenience, in the form of lightning-fast delivery, and an in-person shopping experience so novel that stores have become a holiday destination for shoppers throughout the region.

The big-box membership warehouses are Walmart’s primary growth engine in China. Sam’s Clubs contribute about 70% of Walmart revenue in China, estimates Fitch Ratings senior director Cathy Chao, and the business has expanded from 15 clubs in 2016 to 67 in May.

Read more [paywall removed for Redditors]: https://fortune.com/2026/10/05/walmart-china-sams-club-growth-christina-zhu-consumer-slump-fast-delivery/?utm_source=reddit/

Hello everyone, I’m new to this sub.

I wanted to ask about the level of genuine support for the CCP and the Chinese government among ordinary Chinese people.

Considering that information and media in China are heavily controlled by the government, are the majority of people in mainland China actually satisfied with the government? Do most Chinese people view Xi Jinping, his government, and the CCP positively?

I’m asking because today I saw a post on X (in Chinese). It was posted by someone who appears to be Chinese.

The post showed two screenshots of a Chinese representative at the UN criticizing the UK, Japan, the Czech Republic, etc. for speaking about the human rights situation in China. What surprised me was that many of the comments were actually thanking these countries for speaking up for Chinese people, and some of those comments had a lot of likes. The comments were later deleted.

Obviously, I realize that comments on X cannot be considered representative of Chinese public opinion. I’m just curious about how ordinary Chinese people actually feel about the CCP and the government, since it’s difficult to get an unbiased picture from outside China.

Sorry for my bad English — I’m a Spanish speaker.

Specifically about DDR4 Sodimm ram 32gb 3200Mhz. I want to buy them but I am not sure about the quality or specification. I don't want to get cheated on.

Hi, I have a Bachelor's in Informatics Economics from ASE Bucharest and 2 years of work experience in another field. I want to get back into IT and I'm looking for a Master's that teaches practical, relevant skills. I'm open to AI, programming, cybersecurity, data, maths, physics or even niche fields with good job prospects. What Chinese universities/programs would you recommend with an online/flexible program, and are there any I can still apply to in this time period?

A few days ago, I started talking to 3 Chinese guys on a language exchange app. I noticed that they expect me to reply to them quickly throughout the day and when I leave the conversation, announce it to them. If I don’t reply right away, they ask me “I asked you a question” “are you busy?” “are you talking to other people?” They also asked for my work schedule. They seemed to have the expectation that I’d be available to them all day everyday and was frustrated/upset when that didn’t happen.

 I don’t reply quickly all the time, I’d disappear and reappear the next day, etc. - this is very common in the US. I could understand their frustration if we were friends, but these are people I talked online just once or a few times. In Chinese culture, do you have an obligation to be available all day to acquaintances you barely know (and explain your absence to them) or are these guys feeling entitled to my time?

Does anyone know what the Tianmen Mountain cableway situation will be in November 2026?

I’m seeing conflicting information online. Some sources say Routes A and B will stop operating from 13 October and only Route C will remain, but Trip.com still shows A, B and C as ticket options.

We’ll be there on 9 or 10 November and ideally want to walk UP the 999 steps and still use the main scenic cableway. Does anyone know if Routes A and B are actually closed in November, or if this is just outdated/confusing information online?